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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on loss allocation caused by unauthorized
funds transfers in low-value electronic retail or consumer payment
systems in Canada. Funds transfers or payments are broadly de-
fined to include non-cash payments to third parties,' cash with-
drawals, and transfers from one account to another belonging to
2the same person. Value to be accessed for the execution of such
transactions may be either in the form of credit to an account with,
or loaded on a product issued by, a financial institution. An account
with a financial institution may be either an asset account, reflecting
deposits of actual funds, or an account set up according to a credit
plan.
Value can be electronically accessed by consumers either with
or without a payment card. A payment card may be a credit,
debit or stored-value card. Electronic authentication of payment
instructions may utilize personal identification number (PIN) or
password identification, a digital signature, or (in the future) a
biometrics authorization, and for cards, may be carried out in con-
nection with either magnetic stripe or chips technology. The commu-
nication of the payment instructions could be over dedicated lines,
the telephone system, or the Internet.
The article's focus is on unauthorized electronic authorizations.
At the same time, limiting the discussion to electronic access to
such payment systems is impractical. Electronic payment systems
are the outgrowth of the traditional paper-based system, with each
evolutionary stage building and improving on its predecessor. To
that end, lines cannot always be clearly drawn and hybrid systems
do exist. Moreover, in practice the same physical device can be
used by a consumer to initiate either an electronic or non-electronic
payment. Last but not least, information contained on the device
can be used to initiate payment over the system without the physi-
cal use of the device itself.
i. Typically, payment is by the consumer to a third-party merchant. Yet, retail funds transfer
networks may also be used in the reverse direction, namely, in conjunction with a refund
made to a consumer from a third-party merchant.
2. A not-so-recent account of such networks in the broader context of the entire payment
system in Canada is "The Payments System in Canada: An Overview of Concepts
and Structures", Background Paper for Discussion by the Payments System Advisory
Committee Prepared by Staff of the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance,
February 1997.
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The credit card is the best example. In principle (though not
historically), the credit card can be conceptualized as an improve-
ment on the cheque-guarantee card. It is the basis from which the
debit card sprang. While the authorization for a credit card pay-
ment is typically supported by the consumer's written signature,
card authentication is performed electronically. Regardless, the
same physical card can be used as either a credit or debit card.
Finally, a credit card payment can be made in telephone or mail
orders, and even in payments over the Internet, without the physi-
cal use of the card itself.
Against this background, it is only consumer payments whose
authorization is strictly on the basis of handwritten signature that
can safely be excluded. While the focus of the article is on retail
payments instructed by the consumer electronically, it is recog-
nized that precise and definite borders are not easily drawn. With
this in mind, coverage is extended to all payments authorized other
than by merely written signature, which are processed in retail
payment systems.
The central issue in consumer protection in electronic funds
transfers is that of liability, and allocation of risk in connection
with an unauthorized -payment. This article exclusively explores
this topic. Other consumer protection issues in electronic funds
transfers involve risks of merchant default, paymaster default and
system malfunction. Related topics include transparency and dis-
closure requirements, error and dispute resolution, and privacy. All
such risks and topics are outside the scope of this article.
In Canada, cheques, including those issued by consumers, are
governed by the Bills of Exchange Act,3 though in the context of the
general law governing the relationship between bank and customer.
There is no statute that governs electronic funds transfers, including
those involving consumers. Rather, the central document governing
consumer electronic funds transfers is the Canadian Code of Practice
for Consumer Debit Card Services (the Code). To that end, this
article recommends upgrading of the Code or, more specifically,
replacing it by a more comprehensive and up-to-date electronic
funds transfer code of practice for Canada. In some countries, con-
sumer electronic funds transfers are governed by statute and regula-
tions. It appears, however, that the overall experience with the Code
in Canada has been positive. Accordingly, this article does not
3. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, as am.
2003]
210 Canadian Business Law Journal
question the viability of a code to govern the matter in Canada and
thus does not consider the replacement of this regulatory approach.
The Canadian Code has been in effect since May 1992, and
was revised in 1996. A subsequent revision in 2002 added an
Interpretation Guide to the provision governing liability for loss
but changed nothing in the language of the Code itself. The Code
is a voluntary code of practice that "has been developed through
consultation among representatives of consumer organizations,
financial institutions, retailers, and federal and provincial govern-
ments". It covers only debit cards used with personal identification
numbers. It provides for the issue of debit cards and PINs, debit
cardholder agreements, debit card transactions, liability for loss, and
principles for dispute resolution. In general, "[t]he code outlines
industry practices and consumer and industry responsibilities, which
will help to protect consumers in their use of debit card services in
Canada". Organizations endorsing the Code undertake to "maintain
or exceed the level of consumer protection it establishes"; also
protection given by other laws and standards is not precluded by the
Code.4
It is further recognized that principles and rules prescribed by
the Code are not engraved in stone. To that end, it is specifically
provided that "[t]he code will be reviewed regularly to ensure
relevance to current technology and business practices, and its
effectiveness in promoting consumer protections in electronic
funds transfers".5 Indeed, with the expansion of electronic payment
services, the scope of the present Code appears to be inadequate.
The principal objective of any proposed set of principles and
rules to be prescribed is to implement and enhance fairness to
consumers. The desired fairness is, however, to be attained in the
context of an overall scheme that is designed to maximize benefits
to society as a whole and strike a sound balance among the interests
of all participants. These participants fall into three major catego-
ries: consumer customers, merchants and financial institutions.
The position of merchants is outside the scope of the article,
which focuses on the relationship between consumers and financial
institutions offering consumer electronic funds transfers and hold-
ing or maintaining consumer accounts used for such transfers.
4. Canadian Code, Section 1(3).
5. Canadian Code, Section 1(5).
(Vol. 38
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Policy considerations must also be taken into account in as-
sessing the desirability of any specific rule applicable to consumer
transactions that varies from the general law. Policies are also
relevant in determining whether varied rules ought to exist for
different retail payment systems. It should in any event be stressed
that the overall framework for the search to implement or achieve
consumer fairness is market-oriented. Stated otherwise, solutions
put forward are not designed to adversely affect the benefits to
consumers and will not in fact deprive society as a whole of free
competition.
Nevertheless, a few premises ought to be stated at the outset.
First, benefits of competition are unlikely to outweigh costs of or
losses stemming from unfairness to consumers. In this context,
long-term gains to some consumers later are not a good answer to
short-term losses to others now. Secondly, the focus of competition
is on the lowest price for the best quality product; risks associated
with unfair terms may be underestimated by consumers, and com-
petition with respect to contract terms is unlikely to generate
optimal risk allocation. Finally, the most effective means to
achieve loss avoidance or minimization may be the initial alloca-
tion of losses to the party best able to avoid or minimize such
losses. Contract is unlikely to be the most effective tool to achieve
this result. Accordingly, the general framework includes some
form of regulation, though in the overall context of a market-
oriented approach, as the best means to achieve fairness to consum-
ers in the marketplace under the conditions of free competition.
Another policy consideration is the degree of technological
neutrality. In this sense, the goal to be attained is that of achieving
a balance between general principles that transcend technological
innovations while reducing such principles to specific rules
applying to existing and anticipated technologies. In this context,
a review of existing technologies is followed by a discussion of
anticipated new technologies. Attention is given to the impact of
technology on liability rules.
In considering options for reform, attention is also given to the
need to harmonize the legal position in Canada with prevailing
standards in other developed countries. In this context, attention is
given also to the possibility and need for North American harmoni-
zation, though only with the United States, with which, to a large
extent, retail payment systems are harmonized, and substantial
cross-border retail trade exists.
2003]
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II. CONSUMER RETAIL ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
Generally speaking, electronic retail payment systems link ter-
minals to a financial institution computer system(s). A transaction
through such a system may involve, other than the consumer and
possibly the payee, one or more financial institutions, as well as a
third-party processor or system network operator. Terminals may
be located in a publicly accessed place or at the consumer's home.
A terminal accessed by the public may be located on the premises
of a financial institution or in a public place such as a shopping
centre, in which case it is an Automated Banking Machine (ABM)
or an Automated Teller Machine (ATM). Alternatively, it may be
located on the premises of a merchant, at a point of sale (Pos). ABMs
(or ATMs) are used for cash withdrawals and funds transfers from
one account to another. POS terminals are used in payment for goods
or services. Typically, particularly from a terminal located other than
on the premises of the consumer, a transaction is initiated by means
of a card allocated to the consumer by his or her financial institution.
Such cards may be used, primarily for cash withdrawals, in terminals
located on the premises of, and operated by, financial institutions.
Finally, card information may be used for making oral telephone,
written mail, and Internet orders.
From a Canadian perspective the evolution of non-cash con-
sumer payments can be set out as follows:6
1. The cheque is the oldest device. It constitutes a written
unconditional order to the deposit-taking institution to pay
and is authenticated by the consumer's manual signature
on the cheque. 7 The cheque is not debited to the consumer's
account upon its issue, but rather, in the course of its pro-
cessing in the payment and clearing system. A payee to
6. The process described below is of the conceptual evolutionary development of the various
devices, each as an improvement and enhancement of its predecessor. Strictly from an
historical point of view, the account may not be fully accurate. Yet, it is the conceptual
evolutionary development set out below which explains the survival of some devices and
the demise of others.
7. A cheque is "a bill drawn on a bank payable on demand". A "bill" "is an unconditional
order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it,
requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified person
or to bearer". "Bank" is broadly defined to include every member of the Canadian
Payments Association and credit union member of a central co-operative credit society
that is a Canadian Payments Association member. See Bills of Exchange Act, supra,
footnote 3, ss. 165(1), 16(1), and 164. See further in text and footnote 22, infra.
[Vol. 38
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whom a cheque is issued is not guaranteed payment and is
faced with the risk of dishonour for lack of cover or any
other reason.'
2. The cheque guarantee card was developed to protect the
payee from the risk of dishonour. However, the facility
did not involve any communication to the deposit-taking
institution at the time the cheque was issued. Therefore, it
worked only for small amounts, without affording the de-
posit institution any meaningful protection from fraudulent
use.
3. The credit card facilitated instant communication from the
point of payment to the financial institution to for authori-
zation. This afforded an immediate guarantee of payment
to the payee by the financial institution, which could verify
both cover and whether the card had been reported lost or
stolen. But without being able to receive online instant
authentication from the cardholder, the financial institution
debits a credit rather than an asset account of the con-
sumer.
4. The authentication of payment instructions by means of a
secret code, such as a PIN, enabled the financial institution
to promptly upon authorization debit the consumer's asset
account. This is how the credit card evolved to a debit card.9
5. The stored-value card was developed to eliminate the need
to communicate the payment instructions from the point of
payment to the financial institution for authorization. Un-
like credit and debit cards, which are access products facili-
tating access to value "stored" in an account held with and
operated by the institution, value in the stored-value card
is stored and processed on the card itself. Authorization
and transfer of value are thus performed on and from the
card.
6. Public key cryptography, and in the future, biometrics, are
security enhancement features, designed to improve on the
reliability of the PIN for electronic authentication of payment
8. By itself, the issue of the cheque does not constitute a transfer of the cover to the payee,
even when such a cover is available in the drawer's account. See Bills of Exchange Act,
ibid., s. 126.
9. See B. Geva, "The E.FT. Debit Card" (1989), 15 C.B.L.J. 406.
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instructions, given on either a debit card or stored-value
card.
7. Parallel to the development of payment cards, personal
computer (PC) banking has developed, allowing for access
to accounts with financial institutions and storage of value
from and on personal computers.
8. Finally, payments can be carried out on the basis of provid-
ing card information over the telephone, in the mail and
over the Internet.
In the final analysis, a consumer's payment authorization can be
given in instructions authenticated in a variety of ways:
1. By manual signature
2. At a terminal
(a) by inserting and running a card
(i) and a manual signature
(ii) alone
(iii) and entering a PIN or another type of secret code
(iv) and making an electronic signature
(b) without a card
(i) by entering a PIN or another type of secret code
(ii) by making an electronic signature
3. By providing card information
(a) on a (signed) mail order
(b) on an (oral) phone order
(c) over the Internet by e-mail
(d) over the Internet by (secured) e-mail
Manual signature is the typical method of authorizing a cheque
payment.' In principle, to avoid the risk of dishonour on the basis
of lack of cover for the cheque, a cheque payment may be guaran-
teed, in which case its issue is accompanied by a cheque guarantee
card. This method has not been widely used in Canada and may not
even exist anymore. Historically, charge and credit cards may have
been seen as merely guaranteeing the cardholder's manually signed
undertaking on a sales draft;" with technological developments, the
10. Manual signature will also be required to initiate a consumer credit transfer.
11. For a description of an old credit card system, under which the sales draft is "forwarded
to the member bank which originally issued the card", very much like a cheque, see e.g.
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. McCray, 316 NE 2d 209 at p. 211 (11. App. Ct. 1974).
[Vol. 38
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card payment has been transformed to a payment category on its
own.
At-the-terminal authorization can be made with or without a
card,'2 depending on the particular application. Terminals may fall
into several categories:
1. an unattended public-access terminal, usually either an
automated teller machine or an automated banking ma-
chine for cash withdrawals, inter-account transfers, and
payments to pre-designated parties;
2. an in-the-bank attended terminal, particularly for cash
withdrawals;
3. a POS public-access terminal at a retail establishment for
payment for goods and services;
4. an exclusive-access (home-banking) terminal used solely
by one consumer (possibly also by other household mem-
bers) and located at the consumer's home (or at no fixed
place when it is a laptop computer under the control of the
consumer), which could be the consumer's own computer
or, at the other extreme, a simple telephone or television
set, and which could be used for all consumer payments,
other than cash withdrawals; or
5. a (typically unattended) vending machine at a retail estab-
lishment, such as a gas station, movie theatre, or a parking
lot (usually for small amounts).
Originally, a Pos terminal was a mechanical device, known as a
zip/zap manual terminal, on which the retailer ran a sales draft, filled
in with the amount of payment, under an embossed credit card so as
to stamp the draft with the card information. The customer then
authenticated payment by signing the stamped draft. Approval was
given by the financial institution in response to a telephone call by
the merchant at the time of the transaction. The merchant deposited
sales drafts with its bank that forwarded either them or relevant
information to the issuer who charged the cardholder's account with
each such a sales draft. Manual Pos terminals are on their way out;
unless indicated otherwise, a reference to a terminal in this article is
to an electronic terminal. However, this procedure is still used
12. So far as payment cards are concerned, this article focuses on their use to authorize
payment rather than as a means of identification, which is quite common in inter-branch
banking in Canada.
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whenever the electronic Pos authentication procedure is not avail-
able, even temporarily. In effect, this procedure relies on the manual
signature for proving the consumer's liability; nevertheless, even
where the charge to the consumer's account is posted on the basis
of the signed sales draft, the financial institution's undertaking to
the merchant is given on the basis of the card authentication. It is in
this sense that one can speak of terminal authorization even in the
manual terminal card payment.
Terminal authentication becomes more visible in conjunction
with the electronic Pos terminal, where the manually signed draft
plays no role, even in the procedure leading to posting the charge in
the consumer's account. The electronic POS terminal improved on
the manual terminal card payment by facilitating electronic authori-
zation by the financial institution, the electronic deposit by the
merchant and, ultimately, the automated debit to the consumer's
account. At an electronic POS terminal, authorization may be given
by the insertion of the card by the merchant, accompanied by the
consumer's manual signature on a sales draft. This is the typical
credit (or charge) card payment. In practice, the terminal reads the
card information from a magnetic stripe and transmits the informa-
tion to the issuer for approval. Effectively, this transmission autho-
rizes both the deposit to the merchant's account and the debit of the
cardholder's credit (or charge) card account. In fact, both the deposit
(to the merchant's account) and corresponding debit (to the con-
sumer/cardholder's account) are triggered by the card issuer's autho-
rization approval. The cardholder settles his or her cumulative
indebtedness to the issuer periodically, upon the receipt of a periodic
statement, though payment to the issuer can be made at any time,
and any number of times during a billing cycle. Payment for the
credit (or charge) transactions can be made to the issuer by cheque,
from an ATM/ABM or home computer or telephone. Regardless, the
signed sales draft plays no role in the payment process; it is kept,
usually by the merchant, as a proof of the consumer's authentication,
to be made available to the consumer through his or her financial
institution (upon request, usually) where the consumer denies the
transaction.
A cash advance on a credit card may be given in the same
manner in an in-the-bank attended terminal where the card is run
by the bank and a cash advance draft is signed by the consumer.
At a vending machine, authorization is given by the mere insertion
of the card by the consumer into the terminal. This is typically
[Vol. 38
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done for low-amount credit (or charge) card payments in gas
stations, movie theatres or parking lots. Typically, such a terminal
is unattended. In fact it is a specie of a POS terminal into which an
authorization is made by merely inserting the card. To keep distinc-
tions clear it is treated here separately and not included in the POS
terminal category.
Magnetic stripe technology can be utilized beyond the electronic
deposit to the merchant's account and the debit to the cardholder's
credit account. It can also accommodate a full electronic authoriza-
tion, leading to a debit to the cardholder's asset account, provided
a short (usually four-digit) secret PIN is entered by the cardholder
into the terminal. In attended POS terminals the card is inserted into
the terminal by the merchant and the PIN is entered by the consumer.
In an unattended ATM/ABM the card is also inserted and the PIN is
entered by the consumer. Either way, this could be a debit card
payment, which might be debited directly to the asset account of the
consumer.
The fundamental distinction between credit and debit cards is
the type of account to be accessed for an immediate debit. In
Canada, underlying the distinction has been what is accompanying,
or added to, at-the-terminal authorization so as to attribute it safely
to the consumer. At-the-terminal authorization, unaccompanied by
a secret code entered by the consumer, is not sufficiently reliable
for the account-holding institution to debit the consumer's asset
account. Hence, a separate credit account is debited, with the
consumer not being required to settle before he or she is presented
with a statement containing all debits similarly incurred during a
billing cycle. This is the credit card facility.
Otherwise, when the at-the-terminal card authorization is ac-
companied by entering a personal code, the issuer is presented with
a stronger and more reliable means of attributing authorization to
the cardholder so as to justify debiting immediately the consumer/
cardholder's asset account. This is the debit card facility. In prac-
tice, the same card may be used in connection with both a PIN as
well as a manual signature or no-signature authorization, so as to
fulfil both functions, that of a credit and debit card. Moreover, a PIN
or any other applicable secret code may be entered by a consumer
instructing that payment be made out of the credit card account.
In any event, outside Canada financial institutions have not been
particularly scrupulous in not debiting an asset account until they
receive direct authentication from the consumer. For example, up to
20031
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present days, though subject to a forthcoming change, national debit
card systems have operated in the United Kingdom on the basis of
card authorization supported by a manual signature; no operational
distinction thus exists in the United Kingdom between the authenti-
cation of credit and debit card payments, and the only distinction
between the two types of cards is in the type of the account to be
debited."
The charge card is a card linked to a credit (rather than an asset)
account, which differs from the credit card in not permitting a
deferred payment option, typically subject to incurring appropriate
finance charges, beyond the end of the billing cycle. Charge card
and credit card facilities are thus related. In fact, as a payment
mechanism, the charge card is indistinguishable from the credit
card, with no distinct function or feature of its own. The deferred
payment option is irrelevant for the present discussion and the
charge card will thus not be treated separately from the credit card.
Other than in a Pos or in-the-bank (attended) terminal, as well
as in an (unattended) vending machine, some form of electronic
authorization is required; a card used in such transactions will uni-
versally perform a debit card function. In connection with an (at-
tended) Pos terminal, both credit and debit card functions are
associated. In an in-the-bank (attended) terminal only the credit card
function is performed. Consumer home-banking payments can be
authorized either with or without a card, but in each case at least a
PIN or other short secret code may be required to be entered by the
consumer.
At-the-terminal authorization, whether from home or from a
public-access terminal, and whether or not accompanied by the
use of a card, may be given by means of an electronic signature.
The latter can broadly be defined to be data in electronic form that
are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data
and that serve as a method of authentication. In practice, an elec-
tronic signature could be digital. Public key cryptography, underly-
ing the digital signature, enables customers to control unique,
secret information (a private key) for which they can provide
related non-secret information (a public key) that can be used by
13. Similarly, the forthcoming transformation in the United Kingdom to POS PIN authentica-
tion will apply to both credit and debit cards. It will be carried out in connection with
chip/smart card technology and not that of the magnetic stripe. In contrast to POS card
payments, ATM card transactions have been authenticated in the United Kingdom on the
basis of card and PIN, as in Canada and the United States.
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the financial institution to verify that instructions issued by them
have been signed using these keys. Provided that this scheme is
soundly implemented, and that customers keep their signature keys
secret and under their own exclusive control, transactions signed
with them can be attributed to the customers with a high degree of
confidence. Implementations of public key cryptography depend
on calculations with very large numbers, and are in principle
dependent on the use of quite powerful computers. But they have
been comfortably within the capabilities of ordinary desktop com-
puters for some years. 4
In principle, an electronic signature may be based on the elec-
tronic capture and transmission of biometric information, premised
on unique physiological properties of the customer such as iris,
handwriting or voice recognition, fingerprints and retinal scans.
These may safely be used to authenticate instructions. However,
at this point, such methods are not commercially available.
Alternatively, a card may be a smart-card, containing a micro
processor, participating in, or even taking over, the authentication
process, whether with regard to a secret code such as a PIN or an
electronic signature. Where smart-card authorization is employed,
either during in-home banking or from a public-accessed terminal,
no confidential information need be communicated between the
terminal and the issuer.
Other than in connection with smart cards, authorization in
home banking, Pos and ATM/ABM transactions requires interactive
communication between the terminal and the authorizing financial
institution or its agent. Smart-card authorization may be given on
the card itself; other than in connection with e-money discussed
below, resulting information must nevertheless travel from the ter-
minal to the institution. Communication between the terminal and
the financial institution is either in a closed system, over dedicated
or phone lines, or in an open system, that is, over the Internet. In
practice, communication over the Internet is available only in home
banking and not in connection with public-access terminals. Home
banking not relying on the Internet for communication is sometimes
referred to as personal-computer (PC) banking.
14. For public key cryptography and the digital signature see e.g. J. Kaufman Winn,
"Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signatures" (1998), 49
S. Car. L. Rev. 739.
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Other than in a bank account, "value" out of which payments
are to be made may be loaded either on a card or computer
software. These are known as stored-value products (svP), as dis-
tinguished from access products, in connection with which value is
"stored" in the bank account. Value stored on an SvP is known as "e-
money". An svP is either "electronic purse" or "digital cash". 5 In
the former, value is stored on the card itself, which is an integrated-
circuited (IC) card containing a microprocessor chip - namely, a
"smart card". In the latter, value is stored in computer software. Both
types require at-the-terminal authorization. Digital cash constitutes a
home-banking product. At-the-terminal authorization of an svP may
require the additional authentication by means of either a secret code
such as a PIN or an electronic signature. For small amounts at
vending machines it may not require any such additional authentica-
tion procedure.
Finally, the authorization of a card payment may be made with-
out the physical presentation or processing of the card itself, that
is, without its insertion at a terminal. Rather, authorization may be
given by means of the communication of the card information
from the consumer to the merchant. Typically, relevant information
is card type or issuer, 6 account number, name of cardholder, and
card expiry date. The merchant will seek approval from the issuer,
and thereby confirm the accuracy of the card information, through
normal request-for-approval channels. In the course of the authoriza-
tion-approval process, the consumer's account will be debited. This
method is used in connection with credit (or charge) card payments
between distant parties not present in the same premises. Card
information may be communicated to the merchant by mail ("mail
order"), over the phone ("phone order") or over the Internet. A mail
15. For a comprehensive discussion, see e.g Bank for International Settlements, Security of
Electronic Money (Basle, Report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
and the Group of Computer Experts of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries,
August 1996); Bank for International Settlements, "Implications for Central Banks of
the Development of Electronic Money" (Basle, October 1996). See also Task Force on
Stored-Value Card, "A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis
of Commercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money"
(1997), 52 Bus. Law. 653; and S. Chinoy, "Electronic Money in Electronic Purses and
Wallets" (1996), 12 B.FL.R. 15. Stored-value products are discussed extensively by
Paul Turner in B. Geva, Law of Electronic Funds Transfers, looseleaf (New York,
Matthew Bender, 1992-2002) at §6.02[2][b].
16. Possibly together with the Network name (for example, Visa or Mastercard) and a
sponsor (such as an airline).
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order is manually signed. A phone order is oral and is unauthenti-
cated. An Internet order is in an e-mail message that may or may not
be over a secured link.
Phone banking, in the sense outlined below, is not widespread
in Canada. This is a service permitting customers to access their
accounts and instruct payments by calling their banks and inter-
actively speaking with bank staff members. In such a service the
telephone is used as a telephone; it is to be distinguished from
home-banking facility, substantially more available in Canada,
where a touch-tone telephone is used as a PC. In the former type
of phone banking the customer is requested to authenticate oral
instructions by means of a password and/or confirming secondary
security information such as mother's maiden name or wedding
anniversary. The confirmation of such secondary security informa-
tion may be sought by a financial institution wishing to verify
"online", in the process of a transaction authorization, the identity of
a cardholder attempting to make payment. Obviously, this practice is
awkward, may be embarrassing to the cardholder, and cannot be
routinely relied upon.
In connection with the manual signature, the authorization pro-
cess does not involve any electronic element; no electronic funds
transfer thus occurs. Manual signature authorization is thus outside
the scope of this article. Conversely, the Pos (as well as the in-
the-bank) terminal credit card payment is initiated on the basis
of electronic authorization; the sales draft containing the manual
signature serves only as a back-up evidence, to be sought and re-
trieved for presentment to the consumer/cardholder only where the
latter denies, or seeks proof of, authorization. Accordingly, the credit
card payment involves, to some extent, an electronic funds transfer,
so as to be looked at in the present article.
All other types of card authorization, and all home banking at-
the-terminal authorization, fall squarely into the subject-matter
and are fully covered in this article. At the same time, strictly
speaking, card-information authorizations, other than those com-
municated over the Internet, do not generate an electronic funds
transfer. Nevertheless, the subject is considered in this article for
two reasons. First, the authorization-approval sought from the
issuer is through the same authorization-approval request channels
as in the card-authorization payments. Second, this method of
payment is intimately linked to card-authorized payments, which
do fall within the scope of this article.
8-38 C.B.L.J.
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Telephone banking, operating through the interactive voice
communication between the financial institution and the customer,
also does not involve, in any way, electronic authorization. At
the same time, similarly to electronic funds transfers, the service
involves communication over telephone lines and requires authen-
tication other than in writing. Taking into account that the service
is not widespread in Canada, it will nevertheless be touched upon
only in passing, either by way of comparison, or as part of a
broader discussion.
It should be noted that in third-party payments, all forms of
authorization, other than the mere manual-signature one, involve
a guarantee of payment by a financial institution. This underlies
the attraction of these payment methods to third-party merchants
at the expense of the cheque payment. Indeed, this increased ac-
ceptability of the non-cheque payments enhances the popularity of
all such payment methods in consumers' eyes. Nevertheless, in
providing this guarantee, the financial institution counts on reim-
bursement from the consumer, exactly like a financial institution
that purports to debit the customer's account for the customer's
cheques. Unauthorized payment is thus a risk that the institution
would have liked to shift away to the customer.
The institution providing the guarantee is called the issuer, by
reference to the issue of the payment card, where applicable. In
theory, "issuing" and "account holding" are two separate functions
which may or may not be carried out by the same financial institu-
tion. In Canada, however, it is quite common for the account-
holding institution to be the issuer as well; particularly where the
consumer's account is an asset (as opposed to credit) account, this
is quite natural. Regardless, the present article does not deal with
the allocation of risks among business participants. No distinction
between the account holding and issuing institutions is thus pur-
sued, and the discussion proceeds on the assumption that one
financial institution fulfils both functions.
In Canada, such an institution is not required to be a "bank"
regulated under the Bank Act. 7 In theory, it is not even required to
be a member of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) by the
Canadian Payments Act." Yet, terminology here may be confusing.
17. S.C. 1991, c. 46.
18. R.C.S. 1985, c. C-21, as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 9 (in force October 24, 2001) (hereafter
Canadian Payments Act).
[Vol. 38
Consumer Liability in Unauthorized EFTs 223
Other than in the Canadian strict legal context, "banking" denotes
financial intermediation between deposit taking and credit exten-
sion, and any institution fulfilling this function in the ordinary course
of its business is a "bank". 9 This is so notwithstanding regulatory
treatment to the contrary in Canada, under which such an institution
could be a trust company or credit union.' Payment services are
regarded as incidental to the deposit-taking function, and hence to
"banking" in the above-mentioned general sense. 2' But even in Can-
ada, terminology is not entirely consistent; under the Bills of Ex-
change Act, a "bank" on which a cheque is to be drawn need be
neither a "bank" under the Bank Act nor necessarily a regulated
and insured deposit-taking institution. Rather, every qualified cPA
member, including a life insurance company or an investment
dealer, is a "bank". To avoid controversy, and respecting the sepa-
rate institutional identity of the various players, particularly other
than in connection with cheques, I endeavour to employ neutral
terminology, such as "financial institution" or "account holding
institution". Nevertheless, historically, in so far as a deposit-taking
institution has universally been a "bank", the relationship between
a deposit-taking institution and its customer has been labelled as
"banking". It is thus impractical to abandon completely this termi-
nology, particularly in light of both the dominant role of banks
(namely, those institutions regulated as such under the Bank Act) as
well the existing general meaning of "banks" other than under
Canadian regulatory legislation.
19. See United Dominion Trust, Ltd. v. Kirkwood, [1966] 1 All E.R. 968 (C.A.) and the Eu
Banking Directive, under which "credit institution" is defined to mean "an undertaking
whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to
grant credit for its own account". See Art. I of EC, Council Directive 77/780 of
December 12, 1977 on coordination of laws and regulations administrative provisions
relating to the taking up of the business of credit institutions, [1977] O.J. L. 322/31
(hereafter the First Banking Directive).
20. A trust company is permitted to accept deposits from any person under s. 423(1) of the
Canada Trust and Loan Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 45; A credit union may accept
deposits from designated depositors under s. 180 of Ontario's Credit Unions and Caisses
Populaires Act, S.O. 1994, c. 11.
21. See Foley v. Hill (1848), 2 H.L.C. 28, 9 E.R. 1002 (H.L.).
22, For CPA expanded membership see Canadian Payments Act, supra, footnote 18, at
s. 4(2). Under s. 164 of the Bills of Exchange Act, supra, footnote 3, each such member
is a bank for the purpose of the cheque provisions.
23. In addition to cases cited, supra, in footnotes 19 and 21, see also Joachimson v. Swiss
Bank, [1921] 3 K.B. 110 (C.A.).
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III. GENERAL LAW
1. Issues under General Law
In dealing with the allocation of unauthorized transfers losses
under general law, three distinct issues are to be explored:
1. What is an unauthorized transfer?
2. Between the financial institution and the customer, who
bears unauthorized transfer losses, and to what extent?
3. Between the financial institution and the customer, who
has to prove what, and what is the standard of proof? For
example, is it the financial institution, wishing to debit the
customer's account, that has to prove that the transfer was
authorized, or is it the customer, wishing to avoid liability,
who has to prove that the transfer was unauthorized? As
well, to the extent that loss is shared, who has to prove the
various elements underlying the division of losses, as for
example, the existence or absence of fault?
(a) What is an Unauthorized Transfer?
It is useful to analyse this question by recognizing that in pur-
porting to carry out a funds transfer for its customer, a financial
institution will act on instructions given:
1. by the customer himself/herself;
2. under the customer's actual authority;
3. under the customer's apparent authority;
4. in compliance with an agreed upon security procedure such
as the entering of a PIN or a digital signature; or
5. neither by the customer or under the customer's authority,
nor in compliance with an agreed upon security procedure.
Obviously, transfers carried out on the basis of instructions
falling into the first two categories are of authorized transfers, for
which the customer is fully responsible. In fact, this is so even
when such instructions have not been properly authenticated. At
the same time, it is obvious that transfers carried out on the basis
of instructions falling into the fifth category are unauthorized.
Actual authority, under the second category, may be express or
implied and is a matter between the principal giving the authority
and the agent on whom the authority is conferred. Conversely, so
far as the third category is concerned, apparent authority exists in
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the absence of actual authority, on the basis of a representation
made by the customer/principal to a third party relying on this
representation.24 Strictly speaking, in the absence of communication
between the principal-customer-representator to the financial insti-
tution, no representation is involved, and hence, no apparent author-
ity is created by enabling somebody to comply with an agreed upon
security procedure. This may be viewed as unfair to the financial
institution, so that, arguably, intentionally and wilfully enabling
somebody to comply with the agreed upon security procedure is to
be treated as tantamount to representing him or her, to the entire
world, including the financial institution, as authorized to bind the
customer. Whether that somebody misused the trust and exceeded
the authority given to him or her, or, arguably, even whether no
actual authority was given to begin with, is entirely off the point.25
Arguably, the voluntary delivery of an access device to another
ought not to be treated differently from either the consensual deliv-
ery of goods by an owner to a mercantile agent, or the voluntary act
of a buyer leaving with the seller goods bought. In both such cases
ownership is forfeited in favour of an innocent third party who
acquired them from the mercantile agent or seller in possession;'
the third party's views of the lawful possessor as having acted with
the authority of the owner is regarded as justified. Otherwise, at
least where actual authority was exceeded, the customer is to be
held bound.27 It may even be argued that the mere delivery of a
credit card will suffice to clothe its bearer with apparent authority,
even when a written signature is required, since a proper identifica-
tion of a cardholder is rarely practised.
24. F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 17th ed. (London, Sweet and
Maxwell, 2001), pp. 90 and 307.
25. For cheques, a contrary rule exists in English law under Smith v. Prosser, [1907] 2
K.B. 735 (C.A.). Thereunder, a distinction is drawn between the consequences of an
unauthorized completion and issue of a blank signed cheque delivered by the signer (i)
with authority to issue it, and (ii) for a mere safekeeping. This, however, is an aberration
(see e.g. I. Ackermann, "Signature and Liability in the Law of Bills and Notes" (1993),
8 B.FL.R. 295) derived from a particular strict interpretation of a provision in the Bills
of Exchange Act, supra, footnote 3, which needs not to be extended to the area of
electronic funds transfer.
26. Sections 2(1) of the Factors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. Fl, and 25(1) of the Sale of Goods
Act, R.S.O 1990, c. S. 1, as am. At the same time, the need to provide for these two cases
by statute may support the view that they are not cases of apparent authority and hence,
the mere delivery of an access device to another, without more, is not to be viewed as
clothing the latter with apparent authority.
27. This would be a case of apparent authority, on the basis of the principal's representation
of authority not subject to limitations. See Reynolds, supra, footnote 24, at p. 91.
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Neither actual nor apparent authority is involved in cases cov-
ered by the fourth category, and hence they result in unauthorized
transfers. Whether the financial institution is nevertheless justified
in such cases to rely on the compliance with the agreed-upon
security procedure is a different issue, to be discussed in connec-
tion with the second issue, that of who bears unauthorized transfer
losses.
The following occurrences may lead to unauthorized transfers:
21
1. Cards may be stolen or otherwise reach unauthorized
hands.
2. Card information may be obtained by the physical exami-
nation of the card or a record of a legitimate card transac-
tion.
3. Card information may be intercepted in transit, particularly
over phone lines or the Internet. Risk can be avoided in
transactions carried out by the cardholder using a web
browser to connect a supplier's web page, where a secure
connection is established.
4. A PIN, any other secret code or password, as well as a
private key needed for a digital signature, may be improperly
recorded or kept by a customer so as to facilitate breach of
confidentiality and availability to unauthorized persons.
5. Short PINs and other codes may be correctly guessed. Simi-
larly, secondary security information, facilitating access to
phone banking, such as mother's maiden name or wedding
anniversary, may be known to a relative or unfaithful friend
who may become an unauthorized user.
6. The confidentiality of a PIN or any other secret code or
password shared between the customer and the financial
institution may be breached by insiders with the financial
institution.
7. Security information may be intercepted in telephone
banking (where available) and to a lesser degree in Pc as
well as Internet banking.29
28. For a thorough discussion, in connection with electronic consumer systems and the
authentication of consumer payment instructions, see Bohm, Brown and Gladman,
"Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the Risk of Fraud?" (2000), 3 The Journal of
Information, Law and Technology, online: <http://elj.warwick.ac.ukjilt/00-3/
bohm.html> (date accessed: March 8, 2002).
29. In general, intercepting the content of traffic between modems is much more difficult
than with voice calls. At the same time, if the consumer gains access through a local
network such as that of his or her employer, additional interception risks may be
involved, where the employer's local network operates a firewall to protect its internal
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8. Unless a customer and a financial institution exchange
messages signing respective private keys and verified by
means of their public keys, that is, unless they exchange
messages digitally signed, the customer's communication
over the Internet may be diverted to a fraudulent imitation
system so as to reveal to the owner of the fraudulent site
transaction and security information.'
9. To some extent, the security of banking computer systems
has not been fully established. Regardless, serious con-
cerns exist with respect to customer Pc software security.
Security may be breached in the course of software installa-
tion by a dishonest "expert" neighbour or friend. PCs used
on the Internet are vulnerable to attacks in which software is
remotely installed to capture and transmit the user's key-
board data to a remote location. An even more potent attack
would be based on a computer virus. Such attacks may
capture security and account information. Even a private
key may be compromised.
10. Secret data held in hardware - for example, in smart cards
- are much less vulnerable to being discovered by an
attacker. However, hardware solutions are not infallible;
many smart cards are vulnerable to a fake machine ex-
tracting their secrets by observing the power they consume
while calculating a digital signature. As well, solutions
bypassing PCs require the card to have a powerful processing
capability of its own which raises considerable cost implica-
tions. A required PIN may be entered into a small keypad and
a digital signature may be processed in the card. Neverthe-
less, it is only the use of biometric data that could secure
safe communication of security information.
The first three risks may lead to unauthorized credit card trans-
actions, even where a supporting signature is required, since even
computer system from external attacks, which may prevent security protocols from "end
to end" between the financial institution's system and the PC on the customer's desk.
30. In Pc banking, the customer dials the telephone number of the financial institution's
system, and it would be very difficult for an outsider to divert the call to an imitation
system. Conversely, the Internet has a much more complex system of addresses than the
telephone network, and is much more vulnerable to diversion.
31. Other than public key cryptography, no means have been developed by which customers
can verify that they are really dealing with the financial institution and not with an
imposter.
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then merchants typically tend to rely on the possession of the card
rather than on the verification of the identity of its holder. The
other risks lead to unauthorized transfers authenticated in compli-
ance with the agreed upon security procedure.
(b) Between the Financial Institution and the Customer, Who
Bears Unauthorized Transfer Losses, and to What Extent?
Naturally, as a matter of both fairness and common sense, the
starting point is that the customer is not responsible for unautho-
rized transfers. For manually signed cheques, this rule is explicitly
codified in Canada,3 2 and it is reasonable to treat it as applicable, by
analogy, to electronic funds transfers as well. In effect, the real issue
is the existence and scope of exceptions to the rule exonerating
the consumer from responsibility for unauthorized transfers. One
question arises as to whether the financial institution may lawfully
debit the customer's account for transfers merely on the basis of
authentication in compliance with an agreed-upon security proce-
dure, irrespective of the absence of either actual or apparent author-
ity. Namely, the question is whether the customer is liable for
transfers falling into the fourth category set out in Part III.l(a)
above. Similarly, there may be a question when neither compliance
with a security procedure beyond card insertion nor a manual signa-
ture is required. Such is the case in a telephone or Internet order, as
well as a vending-machine purchase. Another question relates to
both the fourth and fifth categories, and has to do with the role of
fault in the allocation of unauthorized transfer losses.
The first question, raised with respect to the fourth category,
is whether the mere compliance with the agreed-upon security
procedure is adequate by itself to allow the financial institution to
charge the customer. A handwritten or manual signature is individ-
ual to the signer; as such, it identifies the signer. Any signature,
other than that of the authorized signer, is by definition unautho-
rized, and may not serve as a valid authentication on the purported
signer's behalf. Prima facie, the financial institution thus would
not be justified in debiting the purported signer's account. Con-
versely, electronic authentication is carried out by means of com-
pliance with an agreed-upon security procedure, which can be
entered into a terminal by anyone to whom it becomes available.
32. Bills of Exchange Act, supra, footnote 3, s. 48.
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Electronic authentication is a means of legitimizing the action of
that person, or of attributing it to him or her, but not of identifying
him or her. It is very much like a door key facilitating entry to the
system, or better, a seal affixed to an instrument, authenticating it,
but not identifying the one who actually placed it. Consequently,
any technologically effective entry of an access code, even when
it is carried out by an unauthorized person to whom it may have
become available unlawfully, appears to the financial institution
as a valid authentication. Primafacie, the electronic authentication
would thus justify the account institution in debiting the customer's
account. In this sense, the authentication by means of compliance
with a security procedure is not an electronic equivalent to a
manual signature; rather, it is more analogous to the placement of
an "electronic seal".33 The financial institution is unable to distin-
guish between an authorized and unauthorized authentication and is
likely to be inclined to pass the risk of an unauthorized but properly
authenticated transfers onto the customer.
This may however allocate to the customer enormous losses,
against which he or she may not be always able to protect himself
or herself. Conversely, the allocation of such losses to the financial
institution will enhance effective loss distribution and will encour-
age financial institutions to invest in the development of techno-
logies designed to introduce authentication premised on biometric
information, which will facilitate the identification of the person
giving payment instructions. It is noteworthy in this context that
the EU Directive on Electronic Signatures confers the status of a
manual signature only to an "advanced electronic signature", the
latter being required to be "uniquely linked to the signatory", "capa-
ble of identifying the signatory", and "created using means that the
signatory can maintain under his sole control";34 effectively, only
33. See I. Billotte-Tongue, Aspects juridiques du virement bancaire (Zurich, Schulthess,
1992), pp. 174-75 (hereafter Billotte-Tongue). For the function of signatures, both
handwritten and electronic, see C. Reed, "What is a Signature?" (2000), 3 The Journal of
Information, Law and Technology, online: <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/OO-3/reed.html>
(date accessed: March 8, 2002).
34. EC, Council Directive 99/93 of 19 January on electronic signatures, [2000] OJ. L 13/
12 at arts. 2(1), 2(2) and 5. The fourth requirement under art. 2(2) is for the electronic
signature to be "linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any
subsequent change in the data is detectable". Linkage "to the signatory and to no other
person" and exclusive control over the signature creation data are required to make an
electronic signature that of a given person also under art. 6 of Draft UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Signatures, UNCItRAL, 37th Sess., UNDoc. AICN.9/483 (2000).
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the (still commercially unavailable) biometric (and not the currently
commercially available digital) signature will meet this standard.
Mere card authentication, unsupported by either compliance
with a security procedure or a manual signature, is equally incapa-
ble of creating a linkage to the customer to be made liable. Such
is the case in a vending-machine payment. It may be argued that
facilitating payments without providing adequate security is a risk
to be assumed by the financial institution. In effect, this means that
where the customer denies responsibility, the risk ought to be
allocated primarily to the financial institution that chose to facili-
tate a transfer not reliably authenticated. At the same time, where
an issuer is technologically precluded from preventing unautho-
rized use of stored-value cards, or "electronic purse", loaded value
may be treated as the equivalent of cash; loss of such devices may
be tantamount to the loss of cash, to be borne by the consumer.
Yet, in fairness to consumers, such a rule is to be implemented
only in a framework where value loaded on such devices is strictly
limited, and the inability of the issuer to prevent future unautho-
rized use is inherent in the nature of the product, rather than a
matter of a business decision, designed to bypass communication
from the terminal, as could be the case in connection with the
vending machine authentication of a credit card.
The next question relates to the role of negligence or fault in
generating and assuming responsibility for unauthorized transfer
losses, whether of the fourth or the fifth category. Indeed, the
customer's fault or negligence may have contributed to an unautho-
rized funds transfer. That is, due to the customer's fault, a person
may unlawfully assume control of the card and code, or bypass
their use altogether, and initiate an unauthorized transfer. For
example, the customer may have been negligent in the choice of
the secret access code, where such choice was available. For in-
stance, the customer could have selected obvious numbers or let-
ters, such as those of the customer's car licence plate, birthday or
name. As well, the customer might have failed to advise the finan-
cial institution properly and promptly of the loss or theft of either
the card or code, or of any other security breach. Or else, upon
receiving notification from the institution of a transfer, the cus-
tomer may have failed to act diligently and promptly in discovering
the lack of authority.
The customer may have thereby precluded prompt recourse by
the financial institution against the wrongdoer, prior to the latter's
[Vol. 38
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disappearance or insolvency, and further enabled that wrongdoer to
continue drawing on the account without the customer's authority.
Obviously, allocating to the customer losses caused by his or her
fault will enhance diligence and minimize losses. However, loss
distribution will not be enhanced. Moreover, litigation regarding
the existence of fault and the degree of causation may be wasteful,
and worse, may put the consumer, who has fewer resources, in a
disadvantageous position. The alternative is loss sharing between
the customer and the institution - that is, to allocate to the con-
sumer losses only up to a low threshold, irrespective of fault,
thereby enhancing diligence without causing the consumer undue
hardship. This can be done by either statute or agreement.
Fault leading to unauthorized losses may also be attributed to
the financial institution. Indeed, in the case of a manual signature,
the institution's obligation is in detecting the forgery on each
instrument, individually. At the same time, in the case of the
electronic authentication, the institution is bound to implement a
safe system for the distribution of access devices, a safe security
procedure for the authentication of payment instructions, as well
as an effective system of blocking access upon being advised of
loss or theft of the access device. 5 At least historically in English
law, banks' liability for payment of forged cheques has been prem-
ised on banks being "bound to know the hand-writing of their
customers",36 rather than on a duty of care to detect forgeries. In
contrast, in an electronic environment, the institution's duty ought
to be premised on negligence. Typically, such negligence is not
individual to an institution's employee, as where the latter failed to
detect the forgery of a manual signature; rather, in the electronic
context, we are concerned with "systemic negligence" by the institu-
tion organization as a whole and on the level of implementing
satisfactory computer as well as office procedures.37 Breach of re-
quired standards by the institution, while not necessarily attributable
to any individual employee, is nonetheless negligence.
In principle, the financial institution's fault may be relevant in
two major ways. First, it may be raised as an answer to the alleged
35. The financial institution may also be charged with a duty to ensure the safety and
security of public-access terminals.
36. Smith v. Mercer (1815), 6 Taunt 76 at p. 86, 128 E.R. 961 at p. 965, Heath J.
37. A point well taken by L. Th6venoz, "Le banquier, son client et l'ordinateur - R6flec-
tions sur la prestation de services en masse", 1993 La semaine judiciaire 17, particularly
at pp. 22-23, 42, and 44-45 (hereafter Th6venoz).
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fault of the consumer, where the latter is relevant. Second, it is
reasonable to expect that where the institution seeks to be justified
in acting on the basis of an agreed-upon security procedure,
namely, in carrying out transfers of the fourth category, the security
procedure set up by the financial institution must be safe, sound,
and reliable, and that no negligence occurred in its conducting of
the verification procedures.
(c) Between the Financial Institution and the Customer, Who
Has To Prove What, and What is the Standard of Proof?
This issue relates to questions of evidence, or more particularly,
to both onus and subject-matter of proof. For example, is it the
financial institution, wishing to debit the customer's account, that
has to prove that the transfer was authorized? Or is it the customer,
wishing to avoid liability, who has to prove that the transfer was
unauthorized? As well, to the extent that loss is shared, who has to
prove the various elements underlying the division of losses, as
for example the existence or absence of fault?
In principle, it is for the financial institution to provide justifica-
tion for debiting the customer's account; it may debit the custom-
er's account only where it has a mandate to do so.3" An institution
has thus to prove that in debiting the customer's instructions it acted
on the basis of the actual or apparent authority of the customer. It
may nevertheless be debatable how far the financial institution ought
to go in making its case.
In connection with a manual signature, the institution must
prove that the signature actually emanated from the customer.
Indeed, a forgery may be either crude or skilful. However, physio-
logical properties are strictly individual. Accordingly, in principle,
even skilful forgeries can be spotted by means of forensic examina-
tions, which are not limited to naked-eye examination of the image
of the signature. The other side of the coin is that the attribution of
an individual signature to the actual signer is provable. Obviously,
relevant examinations may be costly and they do not guarantee
full accuracy. Nevertheless, on the whole such risks have not
38. Barclays Bank Ltd v. WJ. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd., [1980] Q.B. 677 at
p. 699.
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proven to be burdensome. Similarly, in principle, unique physio-
logical properties or biometric information, other than handwrit-
ing, such as iris or voice recognition, fingerprints and retinal scans,
may safely be used to link instructions to their actual giver. How-
ever, at this point, such methods are not commercially available.
Regarding an allegation as to the loss of a card, it may appear
reasonable, at least at first blush, to allocate the onus of proof on
the consumer. Conversely, with regard to security procedures, such
as PIN or digital signature, the issue is more complex. It is the
financial institution that ought to be required to prove proper verifi-
cation. In this context, the financial institution ought to be required
to prove three things. First, the institution ought to be required to
prove actual verification, including, where applicable, that it was
the actual card issued by it, rather than an unauthorized copy of it,
or even no card at all, that was used in the relevant transaction.
Second, the financial institution ought to be required to prove the
soundness of the security procedure used for verification. Third, the
institution should be required to prove its own lack of negligence in
the verification process. At the same time, the institution is unlikely
to be able to prove actual or even apparent authority, namely, that
compliance with the security procedure was not made by one who
unlawfully became able to comply. On the other hand, the consumer
may be ill-equipped to challenge the institution's technical evidence
as to proper verification; taking into account the circumstances
under which an intruder may unlawfully acquire required security
information,39 the onus of proving intrusion cannot usually be sus-
tained by a consumer.
Accordingly, while typically the financial institution cannot be
expected to put forward evidence more than in relation to compli-
ance with a sound security procedure, this ought not to suffice to
justify the debit to the consumer's account on the basis of the
consumer's authority. A rule not permitting a debit under such
circumstances may encourage the institution to invest in techno-
logical enhancements facilitating electronic identification, to in-
crease surveillance in public-access terminals, or to do both.
Otherwise, a court is left with the need to choose between the
financial institution's proof of compliance with the security proce-
dure and the consumer's denial of authority. In such a case, the
court will be bound to assess the evidence of the consumer denying
39. See above, text around footnote 28.
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the instructions and ought to determine the case accordingly. Stated
otherwise, it is for the institution to prove actual or apparent
authority. Typically, it will produce evidence supporting compli-
ance with an agreed-upon sound security procedure, and will be
entitled to judgment, unless its evidence is met by the consumer's
denial, which ought to be assessed on its merit. On his or her part,
the consumer ought not to be required to prove that the instructions
were given by an unauthorized person or that no breach of security
occurred; rather, the consumer ought to put forward evidence that
will convince the court that the financial institution's evidence as
to compliance with the security procedure is insufficient to prove
authority. Stated otherwise, it is not that the consumer ought to
prove loss of the card, or otherwise lack of authority. Rather, the
consumer's task is to show that the institution has not proven
authority. This indeed may include proof of loss of the card as well
as of no breach of security at the consumer's own household, but
not over the entire system.
Some assistance may be provided to the consumer by fastening
on the financial institution, as a condition precedent to any recov-
ery, a duty to fully investigate any allegation of unauthorized use
and make the result of such investigation fully known. On his or
her part, the consumer ought to be required to fully co-operate'in
such investigation. Not infrequently, such investigation will con-
firm the unauthorized use, and even that the genuine card was not
used in the transaction. Yet, there will remain cases in which the
evidence will consist of that of the institution as to verification and
that of the consumer as to denial of authority.
Indeed, in a civil case, the standard of proof is that of a balance
of probabilities, often referred to as "proof on a preponderance of
probabilities" or "proof on a preponderance of evidence". There is
no requirement to meet the higher standard, required for a convic-
tion in criminal cases, of proving the occurrence of facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.' In normal circumstances it may thus be easy for
a financial institution to meet the standard in relation to compliance
with security procedure. Even in connection with a security proce-
dure not exclusively used for communication from public-access
terminals over a dedicated financial system, the balance of probabil-
ity may support the lack of intrusion. In the absence of denial by the
40. J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman, and A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed.
(Toronto, Butterworths, 1999), p. 154.
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consumer this may suffice to meet the burden of proof with respect
to authority. At the same time, it is the credibility of the denying
consumer's evidence that ought to be crucial in convincing the court
that even if the security procedure has been complied with, on the
balance of probabilities, the institution has failed to prove authority.
Unfortunately however, the task of the court in assessing such evi-
dence may not be easy.
In a credit card or mail order payment alleged to be unautho-
rized, the financial institution is to be required to prove the genu-
ineness of the required signature. This may not apply to a card
transaction where the financial institution proves the cardholder
voluntarily and willingly relinquished possession to the one who
became the wrongdoer, which may be treated as a case of apparent
authority."' Where no signature is required, as in telephone orders,
Internet transactions, or vending machine credit card payments, it is
still for the financial institution to prove either actual or apparent
authority;42 the institution may discharge the onus by proving a valid
card authentication, subject to the consumer's ability to convince
the court with the genuineness of his or her denial. With regard to a
mere card authorization at a vending machine, a question may arise
as to the reasonableness of the security procedure, particularly if
such payments are allowed to occur for high sums, which may not
be the case at present. As a rule, in a telephone order, unless the
consumer's voice call was recorded, the consumer's task in convinc-
ing the court with the genuineness of his or her denial seems to be
easier.43 In a vending-machine transaction, the financial institution
will fail in proving authority where loss of the card prior to the
alleged transaction is proved by the consumer. However, this is not
to say that the consumer ought to prove lack of authority; rather, it
is up to the consumer to upset what otherwise would have been an
appropriate inference from the proof of card authentication.
Where loss allocation is determined according to fault, the onus
of proof lies on the party alleging it. However, the soundness of
the security procedure and lack of negligence in performing the
41. See discussion on apparent and actual authority in the paragraph containing notes 24-
28, supra.
42. See supra, text around footnote 38.
43. Where time permits, the merchant may seek the cardholder's confirmation for a tele-
phone or Internet order before releasing the goods. But this is not always feasible;
depending on the circumstances, a mere callback may not be adequate. Also, origination
at the consumer's e-mail address or phone number, where provable, has evidentiary
value.
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verification ought to be proved by the financial institution. This is
so since such matters form the foundation of its case as to the
financial institution's right to debit the consumer's account on the
basis of the "legitimation" of the instructions according to the
contract with the consumer.
2. Inadequacy of General Law
A detailed analysis of applicable general law is outside the scope
of this article." Yet, a few observations may be made. First, a
fundamental issue with which legal systems struggle with varied
degrees of success is that of the scope of unauthorized transfers,
particularly those carried out by someone who unlawfully obtained
control of the means of access and thus complied with the security
procedure agreed upon between the financial institution and the
customer.
Second, regarding the allocation of loss, only the American
Uniform Commercial Code provides a comprehensive and coher-
ent scheme, specifically tailored to fit the issue of unauthorized
electronic funds transfers. Briefly summarized, under ucc Article
4A, a business customer may be found liable for an unauthorized
transfer where the financial institution proves verification of author-
ity in compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable
security procedure. The customer may nevertheless avoid liability
by proving that transfer has not emanated from customer's organiza-
tion or somebody within customer's sphere of influence.
In the absence of specific legislation anywhere else, both com-
mon law and civil law jurisdictions determine the question under
broad principles of general contract law or of more specific man-
date doctrines. Solutions are thus neither comprehensive nor coher-
ent. Between the two systems, it seems that the civil law is clearer
and more decisive in taking into account customer's fault, irrespec-
tive of any agreement on the point. Both systems take into account
the financial institution's fault. In any event, there is nothing to
preclude, in both common and civil law, the attainment of the same
result as under the ucc, by means of contract.
Whether and how far financial institutions may disclaim liability
for breach of the duty of care is not entirely clear. Overall such
44. See discussion, on which observations below draw, in B. Geva, Bank Collections and
Payment Transactions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 392-421.
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disclaimers are more specifically enforceable in civil than in com-
mon law. Presumably, in civil law, by means of a properly drafted
disclaimer, a slightly negligent financial institution may shift lia-
bility away onto a non-negligent customer not in breach of any
duty. This seems to be less conceivable in common law.
In the final analysis, so far as loss allocation of unauthorized
consumer electronic funds transfers is concerned, and other than
in connection with the onus of proof, general law provides a focal
point for an antithesis or departure point rather than a model to be
followed. Automatic liability on the basis of compliance with
security procedures seems to be unfair, since a consumer may not
be in position to provide a positive proof that he or she has not
given the instructions. As well, questions may arise regarding the
role of consumer's negligence as grounds for asserting full liability.
Finally, in consumer transactions, broadly drafted disclaimer
clauses are inappropriate.
Fairness to consumers will be enhanced by balancing between
loss distribution and loss prevention or minimization. Loss distri-
bution points to the financial institution as the best risk bearer.
However, such a scheme will not encourage diligence and loss
prevention by consumers, and will result in diligent consumers
subsidizing careless ones. At the same time, a scheme based on
consumers' fault may be unfair in a case of a momentary negli-
gence, will prolong litigation, and may give the institution unfair
advantage in settlement negotiations; after all, compared with the
average individual consumer, the financial institution is likely to
have more resources and greater long-run interest in the evolution
of rules restrictive to consumers, much beyond the amount at
stake at any given litigation. In any event, loss prevention or
minimization does not universally point to the consumer as the
appropriate risk bearer. Rather, the imposition of loss on financial
institutions will enhance the development of improved technolog-
ies for precluding unauthorized transfers as well as for identifying
the wrongdoer and his or her apprehension. It is against this back-
ground that some balance ought to be struck between loss distribu-
tion and loss prevention or minimization.
One option is that of loss allocation to the financial institution,
subject to a fixed deductible, in a relatively low amount, to be
fastened on the consumer, once the institution proves proper verifi-
cation of applicable security procedure. The theory of the deduct-
ible is the prevention of financial catastrophe to the consumer,
2003)
238 Canadian Business Law Journal
while still encouraging him or her to act diligently. Consumer
liability for the full amount is, however, not to be precluded once
the consumer becomes aware of unauthorized transfers but does
not advise the financial institution that would have been in a
position to deny access to the wrongdoer. If consumer fault is to
be nevertheless taken into account, one question that arises is that
of the interplay between a broad principle of negligent consumers'
responsibility, to be applied in each given case, and that of enumer-
ating specific acts or omissions which constitute required negli-
gence. Another question which arises under a consumer fault
regime is that of the automatic deductible; if the financial institu-
tion is entitled to full recovery from a negligent consumer, there
may be no justification to fastening any liability on a non-negligent
one.
Finally, regarding the third question, that of the onus and stan-
dard of proof, there is no real legitimate controversy as to the
obligation of the financial institution to prove authorized use on
the balance of probabilities. What may be debatable is how much
ought to be inferred from proof by the financial institution of
compliance with a commercial reasonable security procedure.
Accordingly, in reviewing the ensuing specific consumer
schemes and purporting to establish the optimal solutions, atten-
tion is to be given to the following points:
1. The scope of authority. Is the voluntary surrender of the
means of access tantamount to conferring apparent author-
ity so as to become liable for all subsequent transfers?
2. The impact of the proof put forward by the financial institu-
tion as to the verification of authority in compliance with
the agreed-upon commercially reasonable security proce-
dure. Does it fasten full liability on the consumer? What
more, if anything, ought to be proven by the institution to
become entitled to full recovery? Alternatively, what kind
of evidence is to be brought by the consumer wishing to
avoid liability? In fact, this issue is concerned with the
scope of authority as well as the onus of proof.
3. What is the role and scope of consumer's fault? Ought it to
fasten or increase liability, to what extent, and ought care-
less acts or omissions specifically be defined and/or ad-
vised to consumers?
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4. Particularly in light of some of the foregoing difficulties,
is it advisable to provide for a minimum no fault liability
on the part of the consumer, in effect a deductible to
be applied for unauthorized transfers, and if so, in what
circumstances?
Statutory as well as code schemes often impose minimum liabil-
ity on consumers for unauthorized funds transfers, irrespective of
fault. At first blush, such a rule is unjustifiable. The rationale for
such a rule, and possible exceptions to it, may however be analysed
as follows:
1. As already indicated, in effect, card transactions authenti-
cated by both card reading and manual signature are carried
out on the basis of the card authentication alone, with the
manual signature serving as a mere backup evidence. In
this context, the minimum liability serves as an incentive
to consumers to safeguard their cards and advise promptly
the issuer of any loss or theft.
2. This rationale equally applies to authentication by mere
card reading (without a manual signature) but not to au-
thentication on the basis of card information, whether
transmitted by mail, through the phone, or over the In-
ternet. Accordingly, minimum liability could be imposed
in connection with authentication by mere card reading,
but ought not to be imposed with respect to authentication
on the basis of card information.
3. This rationale does not stand on its own where authentica-
tion is by means of verifying compliance with a security
procedure. True, minimum liability will serve as an incen-
tive to guard the card and secret code. However, in my
view, in such a case, minimum liability can also be, and in
fact is better, rationalized on the inability of the financial
institution to usually prove, on the balance of probabilities,
more than compliance with the security procedure, which
leaves open the possibility of security breach outside the
consumer's sphere of control and ability to prove. Mini-
mum liability purports to balance between the inadequacy
of available proof and the encouragement of consumers to
safeguard their means of access.
4. In this light, there is no justification whatsoever even for
limited liability when the institution is unable to prove
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security verification, including, when and where required,
card authentication.
5. Where it exists, minimum liability is premised on the fail-
ure to prove authority. An exception releasing the consumer
from liability may thus be rationalized on the existence of
proof as to lack of authority. One reason against such an
exception is that the value of resources to be invested in
litigation is likely to be disproportionate in relation to the
low amount in dispute (that is, the minimum liability) to
be settled.
6. An exception raising the consumer's liability to the entire
loss may be justified only where the consumer's fault has
substantially contributed to such loss. An issue then arises
as to the degree of fault to be required - that is, whether
it is simple negligence or only gross negligence which will
fasten extended liability on the consumer. Yet any such
rule may lead to wasteful litigation and may be unfair to a
consumer who may have underestimated the risk. Never-
theless, the existence or absence of a fault-based exception
is a matter of valid choice. Possibly, a broad principle
linking expanded liability to negligence could be replaced
by rules linking liability to enumerated prescribed and
precise acts or omissions constituting gross negligence,
such as writing the PIN on the card.
7. It becomes clear in this context that a requirement fastening
on the consumer a duty to carefully examine periodical
statements, and advise the financial institution of any unau-
thorized transfer recorded in them, so as to preclude further
such transfers to be carried out by the same wrongdoer,
will reduce losses. Such a requirement is reasonable and is
thus a legitimate policy choice, even in the absence of a
broader duty to act diligently with the view of preventing
losses.
8. Daily withdrawal and transaction limits ought to provide
ceilings for consumer exposure in the case of unauthorized
transfer losses.
Overall, both the liability for unauthorized losses and its limits
and exceptions are designed to balance between providing incen-
tives to consumers to minimize unauthorized transfer losses and
the practical difficulties in providing adequate evidence. It remains
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to be seen how this balance is struck. This point is discussed
below, first in connection with the various existing schemes, and
subsequently in the context of a proposal for reform.
IV. SPECIFIC CONSUMER PROTECTION SCHEMES
1. Consumer Legislation in the United States
In the United States, the liability of a credit card holder for the
unauthorized use of the card is governed by §133 of the federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act - Chapter 2: Credit Transac-
tions45 and §226.12 of Regulation Z Truth in Lending' implement-
ing it. Consumer liability for unauthorized transfers initiated from
either public access (that is, ATM as well as POS) terminals or exclu-
sive access terminals (namely in connection with home banking) is
governed by §909 of the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act4" and
Regulation E4 implementing it. Both Regulations Z and E were
issued and are implemented by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. In both cases, that of the unauthorized
credit card payment and the unauthorized electronic fund transfer,
there is a ceiling for the consumer's exposure for unauthorized
payments, and the consumer's fault is irrelevant, other than in con-
nection with the failure to promptly advise. The two schemes are
however not identical.
In terms of scope, Reg. E applies to "any electronic fund transfer
that authorizes a financial institution to debit or credit a consumer's
account".49 The consumer's account must be an asset account; a
credit account or plan is thus excluded." "Electronic fund transfer"
is broadly defined to cover "any transfer of funds that is initiated
through an electronic terminal,5 telephone, computer or magnetic
tape for the purpose of... instructing ... a financial institution to
45. 15 U.S.C. §1631 (1968) (hereafter CCPA).
46. 12 C.FR. §226; as amended effective March 30, 2001.
47. 15 U.S.C. §1693 (1978) (hereafter ErA).
48. 12 C.FR. §205 (1981), as amended effective March 30, 2001.
49. Reg. E §205.3(a).
50. Reg. E §205(2)(b)(1), which further provides that "an occasional or incidental credit
balance in a credit plan" will not qualify an otherwise credit account.
51. "Electronic terminal" is defined, somewhat tautologically, in §205.2(h), to mean "an
electronic device, other than a telephone operated by a consumer, through which a
consumer may initiate an electronic funds transfer. The term includes, but is not limited
to, point-of-sale terminals, automated teller machines, and cash dispensing machines."
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debit or credit an account",52 including "transfers resulting from
debit card transactions, whether or not initiated through an electronic
terminal"." Stated otherwise, a debit card transaction covered by
Reg. E could be authenticated either electronically or otherwise,
including by means of a manual signature.' Interestingly, neither
"debit card" nor "debit card transaction" is defined; terminology
must be in reference to a payment card facilitating the transfer of
funds from or into a consumer asset account.55 Electronic home
banking is covered as well, regardless whether access is made by
means of a debit card. In any event, the dividing line between the
credit card covered by Reg. Z and the debit card covered by Reg. E
is not the method of authentication, but rather the type of account to
be accessed with the card; the former accesses a credit plan while
the other accesses an asset account.
56
Under Reg. Z §226.12(b)(1), unless greater protection to the
cardholder is afforded either by other applicable law or an
agreement,57 "[tihe liability of a cardholder for unauthorized use of
a credit card shall not exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of
money, property, labor, or services obtained by the unauthorized use
52. Reg. E §205.3(b).
53. Reg. E §205.3(b)(5). Other transfers included in the non-exhaustive list of paragraph
(b)(1) to (4) are point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transfers, direct depos-
its or withdrawals, and transfers initiated by telephone. Preauthorized transfers are
included; see Official Staff Commentary on Regulation E Electronic Fund Transfers
205(3)(b)(1)(iii) as am. effective May 30, 2000. Presumably, they are "direct deposits
or withdrawals of funds" under Reg. E §205.3(b)(3).
54. In the terminology used in this article, a debit card transaction "not initiated through an
electronic terminal" (as envisaged by Reg. E §205.3(b)(5)) so as nevertheless to be an
"electronic fund transfer", will include a debit card transaction initiated through a
terminal whose authentication is supported by means of a manual signature rather than
by means of an electronic code. In any event, no meaningful distinction is to be made
between "terminal" and "electronic terminal".
55. See Official Staff Commentary on Regulation E Electronic Fund Transfers, as am.
Effective on May 30,2000, to §205.3(b), point #(iv) (hereafter Official Commentary on
Reg. E), under which Reg. E covers "A transfer from the consumer's account resulting
from a debit card transaction at a merchant location, even if electronic terminal is
involved at the time of the transaction, if the consumer's asset account is subsequently
debited for the amount of the transfer."
56. Obviously, delineation is not always straightforward. A card accessing an asset account
tied to an overdraft line as well as a card that accesses both an a credit and asset account
could be a credit card governed by Reg. Z. Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z
Truth in Lending as am. effective March 31, 1999, to §226.2(a)(15), point 2(i)(A) and
(B) (hereafter Official Staff Commentary on Reg. Z). Presumably, Reg. Z will apply to
activities in the credit line and Reg. E to the asset account activity. Details are outside
the scope of this article. See Reg. E §205.12(a) and Official Staff Commentary on Reg.
E 205.12(a). See also Reg. Z §226.12(g).
57. Reg. Z §228.12(b)(4).
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before notification to the card issuer". This limit was interpreted to
be set in conjunction with a "series of unauthorized uses"; 8 such
uses are not stated to be necessarily related.59 No increased liability
is provided for the failure to promptly advise the financial institution
so that, in fact, the incentive for prompt notification is lost once $50
unauthorized use loss has been incurred.60 Notification to the card
issuer of the loss or theft may be given, at the option of the person
giving it, in person, by telephone, or in writing.6' For the purpose
of this provision, "cardholder" means any person, not necessarily
natural, to whom a credit card is issued, for any purpose, including
business, commercial, or agricultural use, "or a person who has
agreed with the card issuer to pay obligations arising from the
issuance of such a credit card to another person".62 "Unauthorized
use" is defined as "the use of a credit card by a person, other than
the cardholder, who does not have actual, implied, or apparent
authority for such use, and from which the cardholder receives no
benefit".63
Three conditions are stated" to apply in order to fasten any
liability on a cardholder for the unauthorized use of the credit card.
First, the card must be an accepted credit card, that is, either a
"credit card that the cardholder has requested or applied for and
received, or has signed, used, or authorized another person to use or
obtain credit", or a credit card "issued as a renewal or substitute in
accordance with this paragraph".65 Second, "the card issuer has
provided adequate noticeI6 of the cardholder's maximum potential
58. Official Staff Commentary on Reg. Z, supra, footnote 56, to 226.12(b)(1), point #2.
59. Compare with the requirements of Reg. E, discussed below, under which the limit
applies to a series of related unauthorized transfers.
60. Except that settling a balance on a periodic statement containing unauthorized transfers
can be viewed as the adoption of the unauthorized transfers, for which the customer
becomes liable under agency law, specifically when payment is made with knowledge
of such unauthorized transfers.
61. Reg. Z §226.12(b)(3).
62. Reg. Z §226.2(a)(8). See also §226.12(a) as well as (b)(5). The latter allows an issuer to
contract out of the limited liability rule only where at least 10 cards are issued for the
use of employees of an organization, provided liability of the employees remains
governed by the provision.
63. Reg. Z §226.12(b)(1), note 22, effectively reproducing §103(o) of the CCPA, supra,
footnote 45.
64. Reg. Z §226.12(b)(2).
65. Reg. Z §226.12(a)(2), note 21.
66. "Adequate notice" is defined as "a printed notice to a cardholder that sets forth clearly
the pertinent facts so that the cardholder may reasonably be expected to have noticed it
and understood its meaning. The notice may be given by any means reasonably assuring
receipt by the cardholder." Reg. Z §226.12(b)(2)(ii), note 23.
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liability and of means by which the card issuer may be notified of
loss or theft of the card". Third, the card issuer must have provided
"a means to identify the cardholder on the account or the authorized
user of the card". Where any of these conditions is not satisfied, the
cardholder is not responsible for any unauthorized use of the card.
"Credit card" is defined as "any card, plate, coupon book, or
other single credit device that may be used from time to time to
obtain credit".67 This definition focuses on the credit facility pro-
vided by the card, and does not address the means of authenticating
the payment by it. Nevertheless, the need for authorized users'
identification under the third condition for liability for unauthorized
use, set out above, was interpreted to cover manual signature, photo-
graph or fingerprint on the card, as well as magnetic stripe used in
conjunction with a code.'s There is some ambiguity as to whether
the cardholder may be held liable for payment made upon mere card
presentation, but it is understood that phone orders, and presumably
Internet as well as mail orders, in which the card is not physically
used, are not covered. With respect to such orders, there is thus no
cardholder's liability whatsoever for unauthorized use.69 At the same
time, nothing is stated as to the proof of the unauthorized use. This,
however, is not an issue where the card transaction is authenticated
by an added manual signature, which is anyway quite normal for a
credit card transaction. But there is no guidance for either PIN
authentication or disputed phone or Internet orders. 70
67. Reg. Z §226.2(a)(15), which goes on to define "charge card" to mean "a credit card on
an account for which no periodic rate is used to compute a finance charge".
68. Official Staff Commentary on Reg. Z, supra, footnote 56, to §226.12, at paragraph
12(b)(2)(iii), points #1 and 2.
69. Ibid., point #3. The ambiguity stems from the statement under which "[t]he cardholder
may not be held liable ... when the card itself (or some other sufficient means of
identification of the cardholder) is not presented". I would take this to mean that
authentication by mere card presentation is adequate. However, in the absence of this
statement, I would have supposed, particularly in light of the text at the immediately
previous footnote, that mere card presentation, unaccompanied by either manual signa-
ture or PIN (or any other electronic) authentication, will not suffice to identify the actual
authorized user. Mail (as well as Internet) orders are not specifically mentioned, but
must be taken to be excluded, by parity of reasoning with the exclusion of phone orders,
since in all such cases the card itself (as opposed to the information it contains) is not
used.
70. At the same time, to impose liability, "the card issuer must conduct a reasonable
investigation", in which "the card issuer may reasonably request the cardholder's coop-
eration". Official Staff Commentary on Reg. Z, supra, footnote 56, to §226.12, para-
graph 12(b), point #3.
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The approach for regulating unauthorized consumer electronic
fund transfers under Reg. E is entirely different from that of ucc
Article 4A for unauthorized business funds transfers.7' As well, the
approach taken is not identical to that under Reg. Z for the unautho-
rized use of a credit card. The point of departure for both Regulations
is quite similar; yet the scheme of Reg. E appears to be an improve-
ment on that of Reg. Z. No effort has been made, however, to
harmonize between the two Regulations; particularly in connection
with electronic authentication, the distinction does not appear to be
justified.
The underlying principle of Reg. E is that a consumer is liable
for authorized transfers, as well as, upon the failure to promptly
advise the bank, for a limited amount of unauthorized transfers, up
to the time of notification to the bank. Where such a notification
is not given by a designated deadline, the customer is liable for
the entire amount after the expiry of the notification period. The
consumer's negligence contributing to an unauthorized transac-
tion, other than in failing to give a timely notification, is not a
factor in determining the consumer's exposure.
Reg. E §205.2(m) defines "[u]nauthorized electronic fund trans-
fer" to mean:
an electronic fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person
other than the consumer7 2 without actual authority to initiate the transfer and
from which the consumer receives no benefit. The term does not include an
electronic fund transfer initiated:
(1) by a person who was furnished the access device" to the consumer's
account by the consumer,74 unless the consumer has notified the financial
institution that transfers by that person are no longer authorized;
71. Touched upon in Part 111.2, above. So far as terminology is concerned, no distinction is
to be made between a "funds transfer" per ucc Article 4A and "fund transfer" per EFrA,
supra, footnote 47, and Reg. E, supra, footnote 48.
72. This includes an erroneous or fraudulent transfer initiated by an employee of the
financial institution as well as by the consumer himself or herself where "the consumer
has been induced by force to initiate the transfer". See Official Staff Commentary on
Reg. E, footnote 55 above, to §205.2(m), points #1 and 4.
73. Defined in Reg. E §205.2(a)(1) to mean "a card, code, or other means of access to a
consumer's account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the consumer to
initiate electronic fund transfer".
74. In furnishing the access device, the consumer must have acted voluntarily. Accordingly,
where control of the access device is surrendered by the consumer as a result of
robbery or fraud, the fund transfer initiated by the robber or the defrauding person is
"unauthorized". In contrast, the exception applies so that the transfer is not "unautho-
rized" where "a consumer furnishes an access device and grants authority to make
transfers to a person (such as a family member or co-worker) who exceeds the authority
given". See Official Staff Commentary on Reg. E, supra, footnote 55, to §205.2(m).
Prior to this interpretation by the Federal Reserve Board, there was some judicial
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(2) with fraudulent intent by the consumer or any person acting in concert
with the consumer; or
(3) by the financial institution or its employee.
Transfers thus excluded are evidently deemed authorized to which
the consumer is fully responsible.
In connection with debit card electronic authentication, it was
held that "[iun an action involving a consumer's liability for an
electronic fund transfer... the burden of going forward to show
an 'unauthorized' transfer ... is on the consumer". However, "[t]o
establish full liability on the part of the consumer, the bank must
prove that the transfer was authorized"." One can attempt to recon-
cile these two statements as follows: to succeed in its action, the
bank must initially make a prima facie case that the transfer was
authorized. To that end, it is adequate for the bank to prove that the
transfer was initiated by means of the access device it had issued to
the consumer. At that point, the burden of proof shifts to the con-
sumer alleging an unauthorized transfer. Proof of loss or theft of the
access device, put forward by the consumer, is adequate to meet this
burden. Obviously, notice of loss or theft given by the consumer to
the bank is no more than prima facie evidence of loss or theft.
Ultimately, however, where loss or theft of the access device is
not claimed, in determining the question of authorized or unautho-
rized transfer, the court may be forced to choose between the
consumer's testimony and the bank's computer printout, often
backed by some evidence as to the reliability of its security proce-
dure. A review of case law reveals that a credible witness, usually
where his or her testimony is corroborated, typically by some
system malfunction, has consistently overcome the machine.76
Nevertheless, witness credibility may differ from one case to an-
other. Furthermore, relevant case law is from the first half of the
disagreement on the first point (that of voluntarily furnishing the access device). See,
e.g., Feldman v. Citibank, 443 N.YS. 2d 43 (Civ. Ct. 1981); Ogibene v. Citibank, 446
N.Y.S. 2d 845 at p. 847 (Civ. Ct. 1981) (hereafter Ogibene); and State v. Citibank, 537
F Supp. 1192 at p. 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In effect, the latter point may be regarded as
dealing with apparent authority, per discussion in Part 111.1, text around footnote 24,
supra.
75. Ogibene, ibid., at p. 847.
76. See, e.g., Judd v. Citibank, 435 N.Y.S. 2d 210 (City Civ. Ct. 1980); Feldman v. Citibank,
supra, footnote 74; and Porter v. Citibank, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
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eighties; it is quite possible that with time, confidence in the reliabil-
ity of computer systems increases, so that greater weight may be
given to evidence generated by them.
In the final analysis, as indicated, an unauthorized transfer may
be caused by computer fraud or even an internal fraud at the
financial institution." Both causes do not necessarily manifest ma-
chine malfunction and are outside the ability of the consumer to
prove. To that end, existing case law, as described above, is inade-
quate.
The extent of consumer liability for "an unauthorized electronic
fund transfer or a series of related unauthorized transfers" is gov-
erned by Reg. E §205.6.78 Thereunder, and subject to specified
ceilings, liability is limited to unauthorized transfers occurring be-
fore the consumer advises the bank either of the loss or theft of the
access device or of an unauthorized transfer that appears on a peri-
odic statement. Where the consumer is not aware of the loss or theft
of the access device, for unauthorized transactions occurring up to
60 days after the transmittal of a periodic statement containing an
unauthorized transfer,79 the consumer is not liable. However, for
such transfers, the consumer is liable up to a $50 ceiling where he
or she learns of the loss or theft of the access device and advises the
bank of it within two business days. The $50 ceiling does not apply
where the consumer learns before the expiration of that 60-day
period of the loss or theft of the access device but fails to advise the
bank of the loss or theft within two business days. In such a case,
the $50 ceiling applies only until the close of two business days
77. See discussion on occurrences that may lead to unauthorized transfers in Part 111.1, text,
supra, around footnote 28.
78. To be entitled to the amounts specified in the provision, the bank must have provided
the consumer with certain disclosures as to the extent of the liability, the telephone
number and address for providing notices to the bank, and the bank's business days. As
well, "[i]f the unauthorized transfer involved an access device, it must be an accepted
access device and the financial institution must have provided a means to identify the
consumer to whom it was issued". See Reg. E § 205.6(a). An "accepted access device"
is generally defined (in § 205.2(a)(2)) as an access device requested and received or
used by the consumer. In order to be entitled to any amount of unauthorized transfers,
the bank must establish the existence of these conditions. See Ogibene, supra, footnote
74, at p. 847.
79. For an account to or from which electronic fund transfers can be made, a financial
institution is required, under Reg. E§205.9(b), to send a periodic statement for each
monthly cycle in which an electronic fund transfer has occurred. Such requirement is
not dispensed with for passbook accounts updated upon presentation, except where the
accounts may be accessed "only by preauthorized transfers to the account". See Reg.
E§205.9(c)(1)(i).
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after learning of the loss or theft, and the overall liability for the
period ending at the close of the 60-day period will not exceed $500.
Liability beyond the 60-day period is unlimited, until notice is given
to the bank. To be entitled to the $500 as well as the unlimited
ceilings, the bank must establish that the consumer's timely notifica-
tion would have prevented the loss.
Under Reg. E §205.6(4), time periods for notification may be
extended "to a reasonable period" where the consumer delayed
notifying the bank "due to extenuating circumstances". However,
in Kruser v. Bank ofAmerica NT&SA, ° this provision did not assist
a consumer who admitted that "she received ... bank statements
during her recuperation"."' In one such a statement, she failed to
notice and advise the bank of a $20 unauthorized ATM withdrawal.
Almost a year later, the consumer received statements containing
close to $10,000 unauthorized ATM withdrawals. The consumer then
promptly advised the bank of all unauthorized withdrawals, includ-
ing the one that was almost a year old. In the court's view, the
consumer failed to show the required "extenuating circumstances".
Having delayed the notice for the first $20 unauthorized transaction,
the consumer was thus held liable for the entire amount of the
unauthorized transfers.
2. Consumer Legislation in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, in relation to credit accounts, a card-
holder's liability for unauthorized use is governed by s. 84 of the
Consumer Credit Act.12 Its scheme is fundamentally the same as in
the United States.8 3 At the same time, there is no legislation in the
United Kingdom in relation to unauthorized funds transfers from
asset accounts and the issue is regulated there by a voluntary code
of conduct discussed further below in Part IV.5.
80. 281 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
81. Ibid., at p. 467.
82. (U.K.), 1974, c. 39 (hereafter Consumer Credit Act).
83. At first blush, one difference is that in the United States the limited liability applies even
if not specified in the contract. Yet, this is a theoretical difference of no practical
significance. First, United States card issuers will be anyway inclined to include a term
regarding the liability. Second, in any event, to enforce the liability, issuers in the U.S.
are required to meet three conditions, one of which is disclosure of the cardholder's
maximum potential liability and of means by which the card issuer may be notified of
loss or theft of the card.
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Section 84 deals with the misuse of credit tokens, which are
defined in art. 14(1) as:
a card, voucher, coupon, stamp, form, booklet, or other document or thing
given to an individual by a person carrying out a consumer credit business,
who undertakes
(a) that on the production of it (whether or not some other action is also
required), he will supply cash, goods and services (or any of them) on
credit, or
(b) that where, on production of it to a third party (whether or not any other
action is also required), the third party supplies cash, goods and services
(or any of them), he will pay the third party for them (whether or not
deducting any discount or commission), in return for payment to him by
the individual.
As in the United States, this covers a card associated with a
credit facility, authenticated by the production of the card, either
alone, or supported by manual signature or some form of electronic
authentication, but not mail, phone or Internet orders authorized
without the physical production of the card. Arguably, the language
of s. 14(1)(b) is broad enough to cover also the debit card used in
connection with transfers from an asset account. 4 However, s. 84
is stated to be an exception to the broad principle provided for
in s. 83, under which a debtor under a regulated consumer credit
agreement"5 shall not be liable to the creditor "for any loss arising
from the use of the credit facility by another person.. .'". As a result,
s. 84 applies only to "loss arising from use of the credit facility"
which excludes a transfer from an asset account.8
6
Notwithstanding the no-liability rule under s. 83 for credit facili-
ties, s. 84(1) validates a term in a credit-token agreement, relating
to a credit facility, under which the debtor is to become "liable to
the extent of £5087 (or the credit limit if lower) for loss to the
creditor arising from use of the credit token by other persons during
a period beginning when the credit token ceases to be in the posses-
sion of any authorized person and ending when the credit token is
once more in the possession of an authorized person". Nonetheless,
84. See discussion by R. Hooley, in M. Hapgood, Paget's Law of Banking, 11 th ed. (London,
Butterworths, 1996), pp. 309-12 (hereafter Hapgood).
85. Under s. 8, a regulated consumer agreement is an agreement between an individual (the
debtor) and any other person (the creditor) by which the creditor provides the debtor
with credit not exceeding £15,000 (that is, around $37,700 CAD), unless it is exempted
under s. 16.
86. Hapgood, supra, footnote 84, at p. 318 and note 12.
87. Around $125 CAD.
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under s. 84(2), by agreement, the debtor may be made liable "to any
extent for loss to the creditor from use of the credit token by a
person who acquired possession with the debtor's consent". Both
terms are effective only for the use of the credit token until the
creditor is advised of the dispossession or misuse, and where the
credit-token agreement contains adequate disclosure as to the desti-
nation of the notice of dispossession or misuse."8
It is noteworthy that the U.K. Consumer Credit Act contains a
provision dealing with the onus of proof in an action by the creditor
to enforce liability under a credit-token agreement. Accordingly,
under s. 171(4)(a), "it is for the creditor to prove that the credit-
token was lawfully supplied to the debtor, and was accepted by
him". As well, under s. 171(4)(b), in such an action, if the debtor
defends the action denying an authorized use, it is incumbent on
the creditor to prove either (i) "that the use was authorized" or (ii)
"that the use occurred before the creditor had been given notice"
of the loss or theft of the credit token. If successful, in the former
case, the creditor will be entitled to recover the entire disputed
amount. In the latter case, the creditor will be able to recover up
to the £50 (or lower credit limit) ceiling. Unfortunately, no guid-
ance is provided as to what facts have to be proved for succeeding
in satisfying s. 171(4)(b)(i).
3. Federal Regulations and Provincial Legislation in Canada
In Canadian federal law, liability of cardholders for the unautho-
rized use of their credit cards are dealt with in separate sets of
regulations, each applicable to one type of institutions falling under
federal jurisdiction. For example, in connection with credit cards
issued by chartered banks, the scope of liability is set out in
s. 12(1)(c), (d), and (e) of the federal Cost of Borrowing (Banks)
Regulations. 9 For transactions authenticated other than by PIN at an
ATM, the scheme adopts a pre-advice $50 limit, in connection with
lost or stolen cards; that is, Internet, phone and mail orders are not
covered.
The scheme under the regulations can be outlined as follows.
Other than for a transaction entered into an automated teller ma-
chine by using the borrower's PIN, if a lost or stolen credit card is
88. Section 84(3) and (4).
89. SOR/2001-101, PC 2001-367, March 15, 2001 (hereafter Bank Act Regulations).
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used in an unauthorized manner, the maximum liability of the bor-
rower is the lesser of $50 and the maximum set by the credit
agreement. For a credit card transaction entered into an ATM by PIN,
the ceiling is as set by the credit agreement. In either case, liability
is only for unauthorized transactions occurring before an oral or
written report of a lost or stolen credit card received by the bank
from the borrower.
A few points are noteworthy. First, the exclusion of the $50
limit applies to card and PIN authentication in ATMs, but not POS
terminals. However, credit card PIN authorization in a Pos terminal
may be quite unusual in Canada. Second, these particular regulations
bind only chartered banks, regulated under the Bank Act, and not
any other type of a credit card issuer, including all other deposit-
taking institutions and CPA members. This seems to raise issues as
to consistency as well as harmonization. Third, in the absence of
specific provisions in a statute, disclosure regulations cannot be seen
as the ideal manner to deal with the matter.
There is also some provincial legislation in Canada on this point.
For example, under s. 123 of the Quebec Consumer Protection
Act,' upon the loss or theft of a credit card, "the consumer incurs
no liability for a debt resulting from the use of such card by a third
person", which arises "after the issuer is notified of the loss or theft
by telephone, telegraph, written notice or any other means". At the
same time, as long as such notice has not been given, under s. 124,
"the liability of the consumer ... is limited to the sum of $50".
There is jurisprudence in Quebec defining "loss or theft" in these
provisions by reference to criminal law and particularly distinguish-
ing unauthorized use following "theft" from the mere "abusive use"
by one in lawful possession.91
Federal jurisdiction over credit cards issued by banks is in
relation to "banking". 92 Provincial jurisdiction over credit cards in
general is a matter of power in relation to "property and civil
rights". 93 In case of inconsistency, it is federal law which is para-
mount. 4 While all such provisions are not fundamentally different,
90. R.S.Q. c. P-40.1.
91. La Confidiration des caisses populaires et d'conomie Desjardins du Quibec v. Thaw-
maque, [1986] R.J.Q. 2341 at pp. 2344-45 (C.P.).
92. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(15).
93. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(13).
94. For "federal paramountcy", under which "where there are inconsistent (or conflicting)
federal and provincial laws" it is the federal law which prevails see P.W. Hogg, Constitu-
tional Law in Canada, student ed. (Toronto, Carswell, 2001), p. 402
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the fragmented approach to the treatment of the subject is not com-
mendable. At least provincial uniformity and federal-provincial har-
monization are called for. However, neither a survey of all existing
legislation and regulation in Canada, nor a search for a strategy to
achieve uniformity and harmonization falls into the scope of this
article.
4. Consumer Legislation in Denmark
In Denmark, liability for losses caused by the unauthorized use
of a "payment instrument" is governed by s. 11 of the Act on
Certain Payment Instruments.95 "Payment instruments" are broadly
defined in s. 1 to cover cash cards, codes and biometric values, and
"claims registered electronically . . .", to the extent that they are
offered or available for use in Denmark and "can be used to acquire
goods or services, arrange for the transfer of funds, withdraw cash
or make other payment transactions". The involvement of a manual
signature in the authentication of a payment transaction is not stated
to exclude the "payment instrument" from the coverage of the stat-
ute. At the same time, the Minister for Trade and Industry is author-
ized to "lay down provisions according to which a payment
instrument is fully or partially exempted from the provisions of [the]
Act" as well as to "lay down more specific rules to the effect that
certain types of payment instruments shall be fully or partially
exempt from the provisions of [the] Act".'
With respect to consumer payment instruments,97 the salient
features of s. 11 can be summarized as follows:
1. The holder9" is not liable for unauthorized use:
(a) that takes place "after the issuer" has been informed
that the payment instrument has been lost, that an unau-
thorized person has obtained knowledge of the code, or
95. Act No. 414 of May 31, 2000 (hereafter Act on Certain Payment Instruments), which
includes provisions implementing Article 8 of Directive 977, note 101 below, on the
protection of consumers in respect of distant contracts.
96. Section 1(6) and (8).
97. The Act covers also payment instruments which are offered for the purpose of both
business and non-business but the liability provisions do not apply "if the issuer is able
to prove that ... the holder has undertaken to use the payment instrument solely for
business purposes". See s. 1(5).
98. Defined in s. 3(1) to mean "anyone who makes an agreement with an issuer for the use
of a payment instrument or anyone who is the lawful holder of a prepaid payment
instrument in relation to the issuer'.
99. Defined in s. 3(2) to mean "the entity with which the holder makes an agreement on the
issue or use of a payment instrument".
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that for other reasons the holder requests a stop on the
payment instrument". The issuer is required to facilitate
receipt of such information from the holder as well as to
confirm it;
(b) where the payee"° knew or should have known that the
payment instrument had been subject to unauthorized
use; or
(c) where a payment card has been used fraudulently in
connection with "a distance contract." 101
Lack of liability for any unauthorized use occurring prior
to the acceptance of the payment instrument and the code
by the holder is not specifically mentioned.
2. In circumstances other than specified in no. 1 above, the
holder is liable for all losses "without any limitation of the
amount", where:
(a) the personal secret code associated with the payment
instrument has been used, and
(b) the issuer is able to prove that:
(i) the holder has disclosed the code to the person who
has made unauthorized use of the instrument, and
(ii) the instrument has been used in circumstances in
which the holder realized or should have realized
the existence of a risk of abuse.
Presumably, the onus of proof regarding the use of the
personal secret code is on the issuer. Regardless, strictly
speaking, unlimited liability does not require the voluntary
surrender of the payment instrument by the holder to the
unauthorized user. Nor does it apply in circumstances of
100. Defined in s. 3(4) to mean "any entity at which the holder may use the payment
instrument to acquire goods or services, arrange for the transfer of funds, or make
other payment transactions".
101. As per art. 2(1) of EC Council Directive 97/7 of June 4, 1997 on consumer protection
in respective of distance contracts, [1997] O.J. L. 144/19 (hereafter Directive 97/7),
"distance contract" means any contract concerning goods or services concluded be-
tween a supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or service-provision
scheme run by the supplier, who, for the purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use
of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the moment at
which the contract is concluded. Article 2(4) states that "means of distance communica-
tion" are any means which, without the simultaneous physical presence of the supplier
and the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a contract between those parties.
9-38 C.B.L.J.
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such a voluntary surrender unaccompanied by the disclo-
sure of the secret code, as, for example, delivery for safe-
keeping. Rather, it is the disclosure of the code, followed
by the unauthorized use, whether anticipated or that should
have been anticipated, that triggers the unlimited liability.
However, practically speaking, where the code has been
disclosed, it is the possession of the payment instrument
by the person to whom the code has been disclosed which
is likely to give rise to the realization by the holder of the
risk of abuse. In any event, it should be pointed out that
not every case of code disclosure accompanied by the
delivery of possession of the payment instrument to some-
body ought necessarily to give rise to the holder's realiza-
tion of the existence of the risk of abuse. Stated otherwise,
by itself, voluntary surrender is not to be treated as confer-
ring apparent authority. For example, no realization of risk
of abuse, and hence no apparent authority and ensuing
unlimited liability, may occur in connection with the deliv-
ery of the instrument or code to a trusted family member
who nevertheless misused the trust. Finally, unlimited lia-
bility is not stated to be subject to restrictions set by avail-
able withdrawal or transaction limits.
3. Other than in circumstances enumerated in no. 2, unless
circumstances enumerated in no. 1 apply, the holder is
liable for losses caused by unauthorized use of the payment
instrument by another person only up to a specified ceiling.
4. The ceiling for the holder's liability under no. 3 above is
DKK 8 ,0001°1 where:
(a) the issuer is able to prove that the personal secret code
associated with the payment instrument has been used
and
(i) the holder has failed to advise the issuer promptly
that the code has become known to an unautho-
rized person;
(ii) the holder has disclosed the code to the person
who has made unauthorized use of the instrument,
without the matter being covered by no. 2 above.
102. Around CAD $1765. Amount is subject to change by the Minister for Trade and
Industry, as may be required "by the development of prices".
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Particularly, this will be the case where it cannot
be said that the instrument has been used in cir-
cumstances in which the holder realized or should
have realized the existence of a risk of abuse; or
(iii) the holder, by grossly irresponsible conduct, has
made unauthorized use possible; or
10 3
(b) the payment instrument has been read physically or
electronically, and in association with this, the unautho-
rized person has used a forged signature, provided the
issuer is able to prove that:
(i) the issuer was not promptly advised of the loss of
the instrument; or
(ii) the holder (or another person to whom the holder
has entrusted the payment instrument) has made
unauthorized use possible "by grossly irresponsi-
ble conduct".
"Grossly irresponsible conduct", for which the ceiling is
DKK 8,000 under no. 4(a)(iii) and (b)(ii), is undefined. Yet it
is obvious that slight negligence will not suffice. Quaere
whether as to 4(b)(ii), voluntary surrender to a trusted family
member or friend that should not have been trusted is tanta-
mount to "gross negligence"."
5. The default ceiling under no. 3 "for losses caused by unau-
thorized use of the payment instrument by another person
in case of the personal, secret code associated with the
payment instrument has been used" is DKK 1,200.105 This
ceiling applies in circumstances not exempted under no. 1,
and falling neither under no. 2 (unlimited liability) nor no. 4
(the DKK 8,000 ceiling). Such will be the case where the
personal secret code associated with the payment instrument
was used, but the holder had neither disclosed the secret
code to an unauthorized user nor by grossly irresponsible
103. Holder's liability is limited to DKK 8,000 also where he or she is liable under both (a)
and (b).
104. The question does not arise in connection with 4(a)(iii), since the case falls anyway
under 4(a)(ii), namely surrender by a holder that should have realized the existence of
a risk of abuse.
105. Around CAD $265. The amount is subject to change by the Minister for Trade and
Industry, as may be required "by the development of prices".
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conduct made unauthorized use possible, and where applica-
ble, advised the issuer promptly that the code had become
known to an unauthorized person.
So far as the holder is concerned, the scheme can thus be
summarized as (1) no liability (i) after notification, (ii) where the
payee knew or should have known unauthorized use, or (iii) in an
unauthorized use in connection with "a distance contract"; (2)
full liability in case of voluntary surrender, compliance with the
security procedure, and realization of the existence of a risk of
abuse (as proven by the issuer); (3) limited, though quite extensive,
liability when either (a) the issuer proves compliance with security
procedure, together with one of the following three: failure to
advise, voluntary surrender without realization of risk of abuse, or
holder's gross negligence, or (b) instructions were authenticated
by both card reading and manual signature, and the issuer proves
either lack of prompt notification or gross negligence; and (4)
limited and substantially lower liability (up to notice or unless
payee's fault is present) where the issuer is able to prove mere
compliance with security procedure.
The Danish statute is remarkable for several reasons:
1. It is quite comprehensive in its application to electronic
authentication, card authentication accompanied by man-
ual signature, and distant contracts. In effect, the Act ap-
plies to payment carried out from public-access (ATM as
well as Pos), home, and at-the-bank terminals. Section 11
thus applies to both credit and debit cards, as well as use of
codes other than with a card.
2. Liability is fastened on the consumer when the issuer
merely proves compliance with security procedure, but
only in the absence of prompt notification or payee's fault.
Exposure is anyway quite limited (around CAD $265).
There is no indication as to the required level of proof in
connection with an allegation of a "phantom" transfer,
namely, when the consumer alleges either computer crime
by an intruder or fraud within the bank. Arguably, however,
the low amount at stake may make it inefficient to litigate
such questions.
3. To benefit from a substantially higher ceiling (around CAD
$1,765), the issuer must meet a quite onerous onus of proof.
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In addition to proper authentication, the issuer must prove
known breach of security or gross negligence. This ceiling
also applies for card authentication and forged signature
where issuer was not notified of loss or theft and holder was
grossly negligent. To claim all losses the issuer must prove
proper authentication and the voluntary surrender of the
code accompanied with realization as to the existence of a
risk of abuse.
4. On the other hand, while the consumer is not responsible
for fraudulent use of the card information in a distance
contract, there is guidance as to neither the onus of proof
regarding the existence of a genuine transaction nor as to
the allocation of losses in case of a dispute between the
consumer and the merchant as to the amount of payment
in a genuine transaction.
5. The Act provides for holder's limited liability for a transfer
authenticated by card and a forged signature, but only
where the holder was grossly negligent.
5. Voluntary Codes - the United Kingdom and Australia
The discussion on voluntary codes is divided between selected
overseas codes, in the United Kingdom and Australia, and the
one adopted in Canada. 106 This presentation is simply designed to
highlight the features of the Canadian Code and is not an indication
that it is inherently different from other codes. Among the codes
discussed in this article, so far as coverage is concerned, the U.K.
Code is the most comprehensive, as its scope extends also to matters
such as lending, foreign exchange services, and financial difficulties.
At the same time, with respect to electronic funds transfers, it is the
Australian Code which is the most comprehensive in both transac-
tion coverage and treatment of issues. This is not surprising; being
the most recent and focusing on the entire range of consumer elec-
tronic payments, this code purports to respond to inadequacies that
have surfaced under previous codes.
106. The current U.K. Banking Code, that of January 2001, can be found in <www.bba.uk>.
The current Australian Electronic Funds Transfer Code of April 1, 2001 can be found
in <www.asic.gov.au>. It was subsequently amended on March 18, 2002, though for
matters that do not pertain to the present article. It became effective on April 1, 2002.
The current Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Debit Card Services, Revised
2002, can be found at <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/ssG/caO1581e.html#Terms>.
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In the glossary of the U.K. Banking Code, "card" is defined to
cover "any plastic card which may be used to pay for goods and
services or to withdraw cash" other than an electronic purse. That
is, a card must be an access and not a stored-value product. As well,
electronic access by PIN alone" 7 or any other security procedure not
involving cards is not covered. The card definition is however broad
enough to cover both credit and debit card transactions, in which
authentication involves a manual signature, an electronic code, or
the communication of card information. In addition to the Banking
Code, as discussed in Part IV.2 above, payment cards are governed
by the Consumer Credit Act.
Part A of the Australian Electronic Funds Transfer Code of
Conduct applies to "funds transfers initiated by giving an instruc-
tion, through electronic equipment and using an access method,
to an account institution ... to debit or credit an . . . account1
0 8
maintained by the account institution".1  "Electronic equipment" is
defined to include "electronic terminal, computer, television and
telephone"." 0 An "access method" is stated to consist "of one or
more components including (but not limited to) devices, identifi-
ers,11' codes or a combination of these". It does not include manual
signature comparison serving as "the principal intended means of
authenticating user's authority . . . ."I" Quaere as to authentication
by card and manual signature. In such a case, at the point of service,
authentication is by card only. Nevertheless, in the case of dispute,
it is ultimately the signature which will determine the cardholder's
liability. In any event, "[t]he access method or some of its compo-
nents need not have been issued by the financial institution, e.g. a
PKI private key on a smart card issued by a third party"." 3 Part B of
107. Cf. 110, providing for the issue of a PIN separately from a card, though arguably to be
subsequently used with the card. That is, the separate issue of PIN and card mandated
by the provision is for security reasons.
108. Business as well as biller accounts are specifically excluded in clauses 1.3 and 1.4.
"Biller account" is an account maintained by a supplier of services (and not a financial
institution) as for example an electricity company's and department store's customer
account. See Clause 1.5.
109. Clause 1.5.
110. Clause 1.5.
111. "Identifier" is defined in Clause 1.5 to be non-confidential information known to the
user that must be provided to or through a device or electronic equipment to access the
account. "An identifier may be, for example, an account number, card number, card
expiry date". See supra, footnote 9.
112. Clause 1.5.
113. Clause 1.5, footnote 4.
[Vol. 38
Consumer Liability in Unauthorized EFTs 259
the Australian Code covers consumer stored value facilities and
stored value transactions.
Voluntary codes of practice in Australia and the United Kingdom
(as well as in Canada) are unanimous in fastening the entire amount
of unauthorized use losses on a negligent consumer debit card
holder. These codes provide so, regardless of the fault of the
financial institution, except for the fact that arguably, in some
circumstances, the adequacy of its security procedure may be an
important element for the bank's case that the payment order was
indeed initiated pursuant to that procedure. However, the codes
exempt the customer from any substantial responsibility in the
absence of fault on his or her part.
Thus, under 14.8 of the January 2001 U.K. Banking Code,
irrespective of fault, customers' liability for transactions not au-
thorized by them, and carried out before the card issuer has been
notified of the loss or theft of the card, will be limited to a
maximum of £50.114 Evidently, this no-fault limited exposure is
designed to encourage customers to be diligent in safekeeping the
card and access code. No liability is stated to exist when "someone
else uses [the] card without [the customer's] permission, and the
card has not been lost or stolen". In any event, the £50 ceiling
does not apply where the financial institution "can show" that the
customer acted fraudulently or without reasonable care," ' in which
case the consumer will be liable for all losses. Taking care of a card
and code may consist of the following safeguards, set out in 14.1:
(a) not to keep the cheque book together with cards, (b) not to permit
anyone else to use card and code, (c) to learn the code and destroy
the notification promptly upon receipt,"6 (d) never to write down
114. Around CAD $125. This £50 no-fault liability is consistent with s. 84 of the Consumer
Credit Act, supra, footnote 82, dealing with the misuse of credit tokens, and discussed
in Part IV.2, text, supra, around footnote 82.
115. "Without reasonable care" replaces "with gross negligence" of the previous 4.16 of
the 1998 Revised Edition, so as in theory to expand the consumer's sphere of responsi-
bility, and apply the unlimited liability to the case of an ordinary negligence (that is,
the failure to exercise reasonable care) and not only gross negligence. Yet, the implica-
tion of this change in language need not be overstated. As indicated below, acts or
omissions constituting the fulfilment of the duty to take care of the card and the code
under the 2001 text are not fundamentally different than (though indeed somewhat
broader than) examples for avoiding "gross negligence" listed in the 1998 Revised
Edition.
116. This corresponds to two separate requirements in the previous 4.16 of the 1998
Revised Edition: (c) to take reasonable steps to keep the card safe and the code secret,
and (f) to destroy any code advise promptly on receipt.
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the code," 7 and (e) to take reasonable steps to keep the card safe and
the code secret.
It is noteworthy that 14.1 and 14.5 in the United Kingdom are
quite broad in requiring the customer to take care of cheques,
passbooks, cards, electronic purse, PINS, and other security informa-
tion, and advise the financial institution of any loss or security
breach. Upon such advice the financial institution "will take immedi-
ate steps to try and prevent" misuse. Nevertheless, as discussed,"8
14.8, the liability provision, applies only to card transactions.
"Card" is defined in the glossary to cover "any plastic card which
may be used to pay for goods and services or to withdraw cash"
other than an electronic purse. That is, a card must be an access and
not stored-value product. As well, electronic access by PIN alone or
any other security procedure not involving cards, is not covered.
The card definition is however broad enough to cover both credit and
debit card transactions, in which authentication involves a manual
signature, an electronic code, or the communication of card informa-
tion. In any event, notwithstanding the Banking Code, loss arising
from the misuse of a card which is a credit-token used in connection
with a "credit facility" is limited, under s. 84 of the Consumer Credit
Act, to loss incurred prior to notice of loss or theft, up to a ceiling
of £50, irrespective of customer's fault, and not subject to fault-
based increased liability. Moreover, where the Consumer Credit Act
applies, the customer will further benefit from its s. 171(4)(b), under
which it is for the financial institution to prove either that use
was authorized (in which case the customer is responsible for all
transactions) or that loss occurred prior to notice (in which case the
customer is responsible to up to £50).119
Arguably, however, it is up to the financial institution to prove
authorized use even in the absence of s. 171 (4)(b) of the Consumer
Credit Act. It appears that once PIN authentication is proved by the
financial institution, "the Banking Ombudsman's practice has been
to place the burden of proving that the machine was not at fault on
the [financial institution], and if the [financial institution] can prove
117. This is (unreasonably) broader than the corresponding duty under the previous 4.16
of the 1998 Revised Edition, under which the requirements were not to write down or
record the code on the card "or on anything kept with or near it" as well as not to write
the code down "without disguising it".
118. See supra, text and footnote 107.
119. For the Banking Code and the misuse of credit tokens under the Consumer Credit Act,
supra, footnote 82, see discussion by R. Hooley in Hapgood, supra, footnote 84, at
pp. 315-19, and further in text around footnote 114.
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that there was no technical breakdown, then shift the burden to the
customer to prove that he definitely did not use his card and PIN and
that a third party as not gained access to the card or the PiN". It
was however observed in this context, that "[iln the overwhelming
majority of cases the customer is unable to discharge this heavy
burden"."2 At present, PIN authentication is practiced in the U.K. in
connection with ATM and not POS terminals. It is however anticipated
that Pos PIN authentication will shortly be introduced.
It is noteworthy that the £50 limit applies in the U.K. even when
it is evidently clear that the customer has not contributed to the
loss. By way of comparison, s. 5.6 of the former Australian Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer (EFr) Code of Conduct of 1989 provided for
situations in which "[w]here the cardholder has contributed to losses
resulting from unauthorized transactions by voluntarily disclosing
the [code], indicating the [code] on the card, or keeping a record of
the [code] (without making any reasonable attempt to disguise the
[code]) with any article carried with the card or liable to loss or theft
simultaneously with the card". In such cases, similarly to the United
Kingdom, the customer's liability was for the entire actual losses,
up to the time of notification to the issuer. However, unlike under
its U.K. counterpart, a $50 no-fault liability was imposed on the
customer under s. 5.5 only where it was unclear whether the cus-
tomer had contributed to losses resulting from unauthorized transac-
tions. No such liability was fastened on a customer where it was
evidently clear that he had not contributed to the loss.
Separate provisions, 14.9-12, apply to the electronic purse. The
customer is instructed to treat the electronic purse "like cash in a
wallet", so that if it is lost or stolen, the customer "will lose any
money in it, in just the same way as" the wallet is lost. However,
the customer's exposure is usually limited to amounts credited to
and loaded on the electronic purse by unauthorized withdrawals.
Unless the financial institution can show that the customer has
acted "fraudulently or without care", exposure is then limited to
£50, out of unauthorized withdrawals occurring before the finan-
cial institution is advised. Exposure is stated to be unlimited where
the customer acts fraudulently. Exposure may be unlimited when
the customer acts "without reasonable care", as for example where
safeguards set out in 14.1 are not followed. In effect, the loading
of the electronic purse is treated under this scheme like a cash
120. Hapgood, ibid., at pp. 316-17.
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withdrawal with a card and PIN, while the electronic purse itself is
treated like cash.
In connection with voluntary codes, difficulties arise in the
interpretation of some of the specific requirements giving rise
to unlimited customers' liability. In general, the U.K. Code is
intentionally drafted in non-technical, or non-legalistic language.
Presumably, this is designed to enhance the accessibility of the
Code to consumers. Yet, this may be at the expense of legal clarity
and certainty; for example, no consequences are spelled out for the
breach of the duty to take care of cheques. 2' Unfortunately, how-
ever, a more legalistic language does not universally guarantee
certainty and clarity. For example, under the previous Australian
provision, the circumstances under which a customer will "keep...
a record of the [code] (without making any reasonable attempt to
disguise [it]) with any article carried with the card or liable to a loss
or theft simultaneously with the card", are not all that self-evident.1
22
As well, difficulties may arise in gathering the evidence establishing
the specific requirements, and it is not specifically stated who proves
what and to what extent. Presumably, the onus was on the bank that
purported to prove the customer's fault; yet, greater clarity would
have been welcome. However, this is a matter of improving the
language of a Code and not of the fundamental stylistic choice. In
the final analysis, it seems to me that a clear and precise legal
language need not be extremely technical and is preferable to the
U.K. colloquial style. Stated otherwise, Code accessibility to con-
sumers should not compromise legal certainty and clarity. Both
objectives are to be accommodated, though priority has to be given
to certainty and precision.
A revised text of the Australian Electronic Funds Transfer Code
of Conduct came out on April 1, 2001.23 Its Part A applies to
"funds transfers initiated by giving an instruction, through electronic
equipment and using an access method, to an account institution
121. Quaere whether this duty is to be taken as fastening on consumers a duty of care in
derogation from general law on the point per London Joint Stock Bank Ltd. v. Macmil-
Ian, [1918] A.C. 777 (H.L.) at p. 789 (customer's duty of care is limited to the manner
in which a cheque is drawn), in which case it is further unclear whether the duty is
adequately spelled out. This is apart from the broader question as to whether a voluntary
banking code is the right framework for reducing consumer rights.
122. See e.g. M. Sneddon, "A Review of the Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct"
(1995), 6J. Bank. & Fin. Law & Prac. 29 at pp. 40-41.
123. For an overview, see A. Peckham and J.J. Zentner, "The New EFT Code", [2001 ] J.B.L.
242.
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... to debit or credit an ... account' 14 maintained by the account
institution".'25 Clause 5 of the Australian Code extensively deals
with liability for unauthorized transactions. Its salient features can
be summarized as follows:
1. "Unauthorized transaction" is defined as one "not author-
ized by the user"." Transactions "carried out by the user or
by anyone performing a transaction with the user's knowl-
edge and consent" are specifically excluded, so as to be
considered authorized. Presumably, a transaction carried out
by an agent exceeding his or her authority or a custodian
with lawful possession but only for safekeeping will then be
an "unauthorized transaction". Specifically, a third-party's
possession of a device, plus knowledge of the code, giving
the third party full control of the access method, with the
knowledge and consent of the user, will not suffice to make
a transaction by the third party, made with the access
method, into an authorized one. A third party's transaction
shall be authorized only when the transaction itself, and not
merely the full control of the access method, is with the
user's knowledge and consent.
2. The account holder is not liable for
(a) losses caused by the fraudulent or negligent conduct of
employees or agents of the account institution, mer-
chants, and other network participants;
(b) losses relating to a component of access method that
are forged, faulty, expired or cancelled;
(c) losses arising from transactions that occurred before
the user has received any device or code required for
the transaction, as must be proven by the account insti-
tution;
127
124. Business as well as biller accounts are specifically excluded in clauses 1.3 and 1.4.
"Biller account" is an account maintained by a supplier of services (and not a financial
institution) as for example an electricity company's or department store's customer
account. See Clause 1.5.
125. Clause 1.5.
126. "User" is broadly defined in Clause 1.5 to be the person authorized by the account
institution to use the access methods. It may or may not be the account holder and is
not necessarily the actual user of the access device in a given case.
127. The presumption is that the user did not receive the item, "unless the account holder
can prove otherwise", as for example, by putting forward an acknowledgment of
receipt obtained from the user. Notwithstanding any contract stipulation to the contrary,
proof of mail delivery to the address of the user will not suffice.
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(d) losses caused by the same transaction being incorrectly
debited more than once to the same account;
(e) losses resulting from unauthorized transactions oc-
curring after notification by the account holder to the
account institution "that any device forming part of the
access method has been misused, lost or stolen or that
the security of codes forming part of the access method
has been breached"; and
(f) losses resulting from unauthorized transactions "where
it is clear that the user has not contributed to such
losses".
3. The account holder is liable when "the account institution
can prove on the balance of probability" that user contrib-
uted to losses (i) through user's fraud, (ii) breach of speci-
fied duties as to the confidentiality of the code,28 or (iii)
unreasonable delay in notification after becoming aware of
the misuse of the devise or breach of confidentiality as to
the code. In each such a case, liability is limited by available
withdrawal or transaction limits,"2 provided they are reason-
able,' and to losses from accounts with respect to which an
access method was agreed upon. In connection with losses
contributed to by user's fraud or breach of code confidential-
ity "all reasonable evidence must be considered, including
all reasonable explanations for the transaction occurring".
Moreover, the fact that the account was accessed with the
128. When the access method includes more than one code and the account institution
proves breach of the confidentiality requirements with respect to one or more but not
all codes, it must further prove "on the balance of probability" that the user's breach
was "the dominant contributing cause of the losses".
129. Stated limits are daily, periodic, and by reference to available balances. In this context,
three points ought to be made. First, other than in connection with losses created by
delaying notification, available account balance is stated to include prearranged credit.
The rationale for omitting this component from loss created by a delayed notification
is not all that clear. Second, an account institution that allows customers to exceed
limits, and even to incur overdrafts above pre-agreed limits, is not protected for any
unauthorized amount above the contract limits. Third, ceilings to the account holder's
liability apply also in connection with losses generated by user's fraud and not only
negligence.
130. Reasonableness may depend on the adequacy of protection accorded to the account
holder through "the security and reliability of the means used by the account institution
to verify" authorization as well as in connection with an unauthorized funds transfer
involving the drawing on a line of credit accessible by the access method, adequate
disclosure regarding "the risk of the access device being used to make unauthorized
transactions on that line of credit".
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correct access method, "while significant", is not by itself
"proof on the balance of probability that the user contributed
to losses" through fraud or breach of code confidentiality.
4. Otherwise, liability is limited to the least of $15011 (or any
lower figure as may be determined by the account institu-
tion), available balance limits, or actual loss upon notifica-
tion to the account institution. Presumably, this will apply
when the account institution fails to prove "on the balance
of probability" that user contributed to losses through fraud
or negligence (so as to be entitled to the recovery of a larger
amount as in no. 3 above), but nevertheless, the user may
have contributed to the loss, that is, "it is [not] clear that the
user has not contributed to such losses", so as to altogether
be exonerated from liability under no. 2(f) above.
5. The following specified acts or omissions by the user are
listed as contravention of the code confidentiality:
(a) a voluntary disclosure of one or more of the codes,
"including [to] a family member or friend";
(b) for an access method requiring both a device and a
code, an indication of one or more of the codes on the
outside of the device, as well as keeping a record of one
or more of the codes, "without making any reasonable
attempt to protect the security of the code records", "on
one article, or several articles, carried with the device
or liable to loss or theft simultaneously with the de-
vice";
(c) for an access method requiring a code without a device,
keeping a record of one or more of the codes, "without
making any reasonable attempt to protect the security
of the code records", "on one article, or several articles
so that they are liable to loss or theft simultaneously
with the device";
(d) a selection, contrary to the account institution's specific
instruction and warning, as proven by it, of "a numeric
code which represents the user's birth date or an alpha-
betical code which is recognisable part of the user's
name"; or
131. Around cAD $134.
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(e) an action "with extreme carelessness in failing to pro-
tect the security of all the codes".
"Extreme carelessness" is defined as "a degree of care-
lessness with the security of the codes which greatly ex-
ceeds what would normally be considered careless
behaviour. For example, storing the user's username and
password for Internet banking in a diary or personal or-
ganiser or computer (not locked with a PIN) under the
heading 'Internet banking codes'"
6. The user's engagement in a conduct expressly authorized
or expressly or impliedly promoted or endorsed (quaere as
to whether this covers also "recommended or advised") by
the account institution will not constitute a contravention
of the above mentioned requirements. This may include
the promotion or endorsement of an account aggregator
service that entails the surrender by consumers of their
codes to the service provider. At the same time, the account
institution may provide for its users guidelines on ensuring
the security of an access method. Regardless, a reasonable
attempt to protect the security of a code record includes
the making of any reasonable attempt to disguise it and/or
the taking of reasonable attempt to protect the security of
the code record, which may involve "hiding or disguising
the code record among other records or in places where a
code record would not be expected to be found, by keeping
a record of the code in a securely locked container or
preventing unauthorized access to an electronically stored
record of the code".
7. Account institutions are required to provide an effective
and convenient means by which users can notify a lost or
stolen device, unauthorized use of a device, or breach of a
security of a code. "Where such facilities are not available
during particular periods, any losses occurring during these
periods that were due to non-notification are deemed to
be the liability of the account institution . . .", provided
adequate notification was given "within a reasonable time
after the facility again becoming available". Account insti-
tutions are required to implement procedures for acknowl-
edging receipt of notifications.
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8. In connection with a credit card or charge card account,
recovery from the account holder is to be reduced by an
amount the account institution could charge back to the
merchant, where such a charge-back right could have been
exercised under the merchant agreement.
Consumer stored-value products are governed by Part B of the
Australian Code. Under Clause 16, refund for lost or stolen stored-
value is available only upon the fulfilment of two conditions.
The first condition is that "a stored value operator, together with
relevant system participants, has or can create a reliable record of
the amount of stored value controlled by a stored value facility
from time to time". The second condition is that "the stored value
operator and any relevant system participants can prevent any
further transfers of stored value from the facility". The stored value
operator is required to provide the user with a means to advise
promptly of loss or safe. Refund is to be made when advice is
properly given. There is however no ceiling or exception for liabil-
ity for unauthorized use prior to the giving of notice of loss or
theft.
6. Voluntary Code in Canada
The Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Debit Card Ser-
vices of 1992 (revised February 1996) "applies only to services
that use debit cards and personal identification numbers (PIN)
to access point-of-service terminals, such as automated banking
machines (ABM), point-of-sale (Pos) terminals and debit card termi-
nals in the home". It "does not cover transactions that take place
outside Canada, or that transfer funds into or out of Canada".'
Unfortunately, "debit card", "debit card service" and "debit card
transactions" are defined in s. 8 so as to refer to each other, without
completely highlighting all the distinctive features of the debit
card, that distinguish it from any other access device. True, "debit
card" is defined in s. 8(5) to mean "a card with electronically
readable data that is used, in conjunction with a PIN to confirm the
identity of the cardholder and authorize debit card transactions". In
departure from the position in both the United Kingdom and the
United States, the definition is in terms of the specific electronic
authentication without any reference to the type of account accessed.
132. Section 1(4).
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Whether the limitation to an asset account is still intended is unclear.
Literally read, the Code does not apply to a debit card accessing an
asset account when authentication is supported by a manual signa-
ture (or any other means of authentication except PIN), but will apply
to a credit card, accessing a credit plan, used with a PIN. While the
former card may not exist in Canada and with respect to the latter
card the Code may be superseded by legislation or regulation, 33
the ambiguity is unhelpful; if desired, departure from the position
elsewhere ought to be spelled out more unequivocally. Be it as it
may, it is clear that only card plus PIN authentication is covered by
the Code in Canada.
The Code covers funds transfers from both public-access (Pos
and ABM) and exclusive-access (home) terminals, provided they
are initiated by card together with PIN (and no other) method of
authentication. Whether access is to asset or credit accounts makes
no difference; hence, the Code applies to credit cards authenticated
with PIN.' 34 At the same time, stored-value products are not intended
to be covered; nevertheless, when authentication of a stored-value
card transaction requires a PIN to be entered, the picture is not all
that clear. Thus, the loading and unloading of a stored-valued card
from and into an account, can be viewed as "withdrawal" and
"deposit", so as to be a "debit card transaction", to which the Code
will apply. Moreover, "payment" to a third party by means of such
a card may be viewed as covered as well. 3 5 While the first conclu-
sion is defensible, that is less so for the latter. Nevertheless, nowhere
does the Code specifically state that the "debit card" is strictly an
access and not stored-value product, facilitating access to accounts
operated by a financial institution.
With regard to cardholders' responsibility for debit card transac-
tions, the basic principle, set out in s. 5(1), is that "[c]ardholders
are responsible for all authorized use of valid cards". A Guide to
the Interpretation of Section 5 "agreed to by the Electronic Funds
Transfer Group" in January 2002 was added as Appendix A to the
Code.'36 Thereunder, "[a]n authorized transaction is one in which
133. See Part IV.3, above.
134. This is consistent with their exclusion from the Bank Act Regulations, discussed above
in Part 111.8, text around footnote 168, dealing with the unauthorized use of credit
cards.
135. "Debit card transactions" are defined in s. 8 to mean "deposits, withdrawals, payments,
or other funds transfers made at point-of-service terminals using a debit card".
136. Canadian Code, s. 1(2).
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the card and PIN are used to carry out the transaction and the
cardholder has not been the victim of trickery, force, intimidation or
theft". Presumably, an unauthorized use by a person to whom the
cardholder voluntarily delivered the card and advised of the PIN, is
"authorized", so that the cardholder is liable for it; arguably this
cannot be viewed as a case of "trickery". Stated otherwise, while
this is not certain, the better view appears to be that "trickery" is
limited to the circumstances under which the card or PIN has been
obtained by the user, and does not cover the fraudulent use of the
card by an authorized person in lawful possession of both the card
and PIN. Yet, the approach undertaken in the definition is question-
able; that is, whether a transaction is authorized or not is a matter of
actual or apparent authority, and not actual use of card and PIN. In
effect, the Interpretation expands "apparent authority" to include all
cases of use following the voluntary surrender of the card and code.
Indeed, by itself, a rule fastening full liability for the use by a person
in lawful possession is defensible. Nevertheless, it would have been
more appropriate to provide for such a rule more directly.
The status of the Guide to the Interpretation of Section 5 is not
entirely clear. Stated otherwise, there is a question as to whether it
is binding on subscribing Institutions exactly as the Code. As well,
there is no guidance as to determining a conflict between the Code
and the Interpretation Guide. For example, point 4 to Interpretation
to Clause 5 provides that the use of "a PIN combination selected
from the cardholder's name, telephone number, date of birth or
social insurance number" is tantamount to a voluntary PIN disclo-
sure. This may be seen as expanding cardholder's exposure. It is
arguable that this went beyond mere interpretation and provided for
substantive rules, some of which may be seen as going too far. Thus,
it is difficult to see how the use of a PIN selected from the date of
birth is equivalent to voluntary disclosure; at the most, it is contribu-
tion to loss by negligence. However, the existence of negligence and
its causation to loss is a matter of assessment in any given case. For
example, if a thief stole the card without any document revealing
the cardholder's date of birth, and having acted without knowledge
of the date, nevertheless managed to use the card, it is hard to see
how the choice of the birth date as PIN amounted to a voluntary PIN
disclosure which makes the cardholder fully responsible. Further-
more, a voluntary disclosure is deemed to exist under the quoted
language of point 4 even when the PIN is a combination of date of
birth, name, telephone number, or social security number.
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Note that in Australia, under Clause 5.6(d) of the EFT Code, for
the selection of" a numeric code which represents the user's birth
date or an alphabetical code which is a recognizable part of the
user's name" to be a violation by user, the financial institution must
"immediately before the user's selection", "specifically instruct...
the user not to make such a selection and warn ... the user of the
consequences of such a selection .. .". Only Australia (and not the
EU, U.K. or Denmark) enumerates the choice of code as possibly
involving fault leading to full exposure. Arguably, point 4 ought to
be eliminated, so that only poorly disguising the code, as elaborated
in point 5 to the Interpretation of Clause 5, will constitute relevant
negligence.
Under s. 5(3)(b) of the Canadian Code, cardholders are not
liable for losses resulting from the unauthorized use of the card
and PIN in circumstances under which the issuer is responsible for
preventing such use, as for example after the card has been reported
lost or stolen, the card is canceled or expired, or where "the card-
holder has reported that the PIN may be known to someone other
than the cardholder". However, there is no requirement for an issuer
to make available and to advise consumers of a 24-hour phone line
to which a notice could be given free of charge from anywhere
where the card could be used.
Under s. 5(3)(c), cardholders are not liable for losses resulting
from the unauthorized use, "where the cardholder has unintention-
ally contributed to such use, provided the cardholder co-operates
in any subsequent investigation".137 The provision raises a funda-
mental policy question: indeed, co-operation may be a factor in
assessing the cardholder's credibility - but could it be a factor
in the loss allocation? Where it is found that loss resulted from
circumstances beyond cardholder's control, no liability ought to be
fastened on cardholder, regardless of co-operation.
In contrast to the exoneration from liability provided by
s. 5(3)(c), under s. 5(4), a cardholder who contributes to an unau-
thorized use "will be liable for the resulting loss", though up to
"established debit card transaction withdrawal limits". So far as
137. The Interpretation provides the example of a cardholder who has been the victim of
fraud, theft, or has been coerced by trickery, force or intimidation, as long as the
cardholder reports the incident promptly and co-operates fully in any subsequent
investigation. In conformity with the Interpretation to s. 5(1), ibid., under which a
transaction by a victim of trickery, force, intimidation or theft is unauthorized, such a
victim will nevertheless be liable if not promptly advising and fully co-operating.
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the account balance serves as such limit, s. 5(4) points out that loss
"may exceed the actual balance in an account" in two situations:
that of a line of credit or overdraft protection linked to the account,
and "a fraudulent deposit at an ABM". It is not clear whether such a
fraudulent ABM deposit is that of the customer or the wrongdoer;
while s. 5(2) specifically holds cardholders responsible "if they
make entry errors at point-of-service terminals, or if they make
fraudulent or worthless deposits", s. 5(4) is silent as to who has
made the "fraudulent deposit at an ABM" so as to inflate the available
balance for withdrawal.
Section 5(5) elaborates on the circumstances under which a
"cardholder contributes to unauthorized use", so as to be liable for
the resulting loss under s. 5(4). Such would be the case where the
cardholder voluntarily discloses the code, writes it on the card, or
keeps a poorly disguised record of it in proximity with the card, as
well as upon the cardholder's failure, "within reasonable time"
after the event, 3' to advise the issuer of the loss, theft, or misuse of
the card, or the loss of confidentiality as to the code. The Interpreta-
tion clarifies that a cardholder whose PIN is obtained by coercion,
trickery, force or intimidation, or whose PIN is observed at a point-
of-sale terminal, does not disclose it voluntarily. Similarly, the fact
that a customer uses the same PIN for more than one card does not
constitute contribution to unauthorized use. Conversely, a card-
holder contributes to unauthorized use when he or she selects his or
her birth date as their PIN and keep the debit card in proximity with
his or her driver's licence which has a record of the birth date.
However, a PIN is reasonably disguised, upon its concealment within
the record, namely, by rearranging the numerals, substituting other
numerals or symbols, or surrounding it by other numbers or symbols.
In the final analysis, "[t]he reasonableness of an attempt to disguise
a PIN should be assessed from the point of view of the reasonable
cardholder, not from the point of view of the thief or the card issuer's
official who through experience have become familiar with many
types of disguises and their strengths and weaknesses".
It should be pointed out that the relationship among subs. 3(c),
4, and 5 of s. 5 of the Canadian Code is not all that clear. Under
subs. 3(c), a cardholder is not liable for losses resulting from
138. According to the Interpretation, "within reasonable time" means promptly, or more
specifically, "as soon as the cardholder becomes aware of the loss or disclosure".
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circumstances beyond the cardholder's control, such as "unautho-
rized use where the cardholder has unintentionally contributed to
such loss, provided the cardholder co-operates in any subsequent
investigation". At the same time under subs. 4, '[i]n all other cases,
when a cardholder contributes to unauthorized loss, the cardholder
will be liable for the resulting loss . . .". A list of events when
"cardholder contributes to unauthorized loss" is set out in subs. 5.
But even if in such events (voluntary disclosure of PIN etc. or
failure to report loss) the cardholder can be said to be negligent,
does it necessarily follow that cardholder has not "unintentionally
contributed to ... loss" so as to be excluded from subs. 4? That is,
negligence and lack of intention are not mutually exclusive.
Regardless, most other sources require more than negligence;
rather, what is required is "extreme carelessness" in Australia,
"extreme negligence" in the EU, or "gross irresponsible conduct"
in Denmark. Only the United Kingdom is satisfied with lack of
"reasonable care". Be it as it may, the Canadian Code is not explicit
in allocating responsibility on the basis of fault. Rather, situations
involving fault are deemed to constitute voluntary disclosure. How-
ever, as indicated, the better view is that voluntary disclosure and
fault contributing to loss are in fact distinguishable and ought not to
be confused. Specifically, voluntary disclosure and surrender may
be viewed as a matter of apparent authority, which may automati-
cally justify full liability. In contrast, fault and the loss caused by it,
for which the cardholder is to become liable, are matters to be
assessed in each given case.
7. EU Pronouncements
EU Directive 97/7/Ec3 on the protection of consumers in respect
of distance contracts deals with non-face-to-face consumer transac-
tions. It addresses some issues relating to payment by cards in such
contracts, namely, in situations where payment is carried out on the
basis of card information communicated to the supplier.
Article 8 of the Directive requires Member States to ensure
that appropriate measures exist to allow a consumer "to request
cancellation of a payment where fraudulent use has been made on
his payment card in connections with distance contracts ... ", as
139. Council Directive 977 of June 4, 1997 on consumer protection in respect of distance
contracts, [1997] O.J. L. 144/19.
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well as, "in the event of fraudulent use, to be re-credited with the
sums paid or have them returned". "Fraudulent use" is not defined;
presumably it includes unauthorized use. Quaere as to whether it
includes fraud by the seller as to the existence of a transaction or
the price agreed, where there was a genuine communication be-
tween the seller and consumer. Regardless, no provision is made
as to the onus of proof.
EU Recommendation 97/489/Ec 4 covers transactions by elec-
tronic payment instruments, broadly defined, in arts. 1 and 2, to
encompass both access and stored-value products. Regarding the
unauthorized use of an electronic payment instrument, the recom-
mendation provides in arts. 5-8 as follows:
1. The holder 4 ' is not liable, "if the payment instrument has
been used without physical presentation (of the instrument
itself)". To that end, "[t]he use of a confidential code or any
other similar proof of identity is not, by itself, sufficient to
entail the holder's liability".
2. Other than as provided below, up to notification the holder
bears "the loss sustained in consequence of the loss or theft
of the electronic payment instrument up to a limit, which
may not exceed ECU 150".142
3. However, the limit does not apply in the following situa-
tions:
(a) Where the holder acted "with extreme" negligence.
(b) Where the holder acted in contravention of specified
duties. These duties can be set out as follows: (i) to
use the electronic payment instrument according to the
terms governing its issuing and use, and in particular,
to take all reasonable steps to keep safe the electronic
payment instrument and the means (such as a personal
identification number or other code) which enables it
to be used; (ii) to advise the issuer without delay after
140. EC, Council Recommendation 97/489 of August 2, 1996 on transactions by electronic
payments, [1996] O.J. L. 208/52 (hereafter Recommendation 97/489/Ec).
141. "Holder" is defined in art. 2(f) as "a person who, pursuant to a contract concluded
between him/her and an issuer, holds a payment instrument". The context requires that
he/she remains "holder" even when he/she does not "hold", as a result of having been
dispossessed of the payment instrument. "Payment instrument" in the definition of
"holder" must be taken to mean "electronic payment instrument".
142. Around CAD $245.
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becoming aware of the loss or theft of the electronic
payment instrument or the secret code, the recording on
the holder's account of any unauthorized transaction, or
any error or other irregularity in the maintenance of the
account by the issuer; or (iii) not to record secret code
in any recognizable form, in particular on the electronic
payment instrument or any item which the holder keeps
or carries with it.
(c) Where the holder acted fraudulently.
For the limit under no. 2 to be inapplicable, no causal link
is required between any such a breach and the actual loss.
4. Other than when the holder acted fraudulently, there is no
holder's liability for loss arising in consequences of the
loss or theft of the electronic payment instrument, "[a]s
soon as the holder has notified the issuer" of the loss or
theft of the electronic payment instrument or the secret
code.
5. The issuer is required not to disclose the holder's secret
code "except to the holder", as well as to provide an effec-
tive means of notification in case of loss or theft. The issuer
is further required, in the case of a dispute with the holder
concerning a transaction effected by means of an electronic
payment instrument, "and without prejudice to any proof
to the contrary that may be produced by the holder", to
prove that the transaction "was accurately recorded and
entered into accounts", and that it "was not affected by
technical breakdown or other deficiency".
The EU Recommendation is stated in art. 1(1) to apply to (a)
"transfers of funds, other than those ordered and executed by finan-
cial institutions, effected by means of an electronic payment instru-
ment", as well as to (b) "cash withdrawals by means of an electronic
payment instrument and the loading (and unloading) of an electronic
money instrument, at devices such as cash dispensing machines and
automated teller machines and at the premises of the issuer or an
institution who is under contract to accept the payment instru-
ment".'43 "Electronic payment instrument" is defined to be "an in-
strument enabling its holder to effect transactions of the kind
specified in art. 1(1)". This is stated to cover "both remote access
143. Emphasis added.
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payment instruments and electronic money instruments". "Remote
access payment instrument" is in effect an access product. It is
defined to mean "an instrument enabling the holder to access funds
held on his/her account at an institution, whereby payment is al-
lowed to be made to a payee and usually requiring a personal
identification code and/or any other similar proof of identity. This
includes in particular payment cards (whether credit, debit, deferred
debit or charge cards) and phone- and phone banking applications".
"Electronic money instrument" is effectively a stored-value product;
it is defined to mean "a reloadable payment instrument other than a
remote access payment instrument, whether a stored-value card or a
computer memory, on which value units are stored electronically,
enabling the holder to effect transactions of the kind specified in
Article l(1)".144
Accordingly, all consumer-initiated electronic funds transfers,
whether by means of access or stored-value products, are covered
by the EU Recommendation. While art. l(l)(a) appears to cover
payment into accounts, including from home or a Pos terminal, art.
l(1)(b) covers all cash withdrawal and the loading and unloading of
stored-value product. Yet, a few doubts remain. First, per the defini-
tion of "remote access payment instrument" reproduced above, elec-
tronic authentication must be one "usually requiring a personal
identification code and/or any other similar proof of identity. This
includes in particular payment cards (whether credit, debit, deferred
debit or charge cards) and phone- and phone banking applications".
Other than for the reference to "usually", which may suggest that
the definition is not exhaustive, this would have excluded the
involvement of a manual signature in conjunction with the card
authentication. Second, it is uncertain whether "instrument" requires
a physical device so as to exclude, other than in connection with
"phone- and phone banking applications" which are specifically
mentioned, a mere PIN or digital signature authentication, unaccom-
panied by the use of card. In the alternative, the reference to "phone-
and phone banking applications" may be designed to indicate that
an "instrument" need not be a physical device.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROPOSED PRINCIPLES
The Canadian Code of Practice for Debit Card Services cur-
rently in effect is fundamentally sound. Primafacie, it needs more
144. Terms are defined in art. 2.
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of an update than of an upgrade; this is in response to fast-moving
technological developments and not basic flaws. Still, the experi-
ence with the Code, side by side with experience elsewhere, per-
mits the introduction of changes with the view of enhancing
protections to consumers and the presentation of improvements to
the scheme.
Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive model is that of the new
Australian EFT Code. Nevertheless, the view presented in this article
is that the positions adopted by that code ought not to be slavishly
followed. A few points should be highlighted.
First, there is some ambiguity as to whether authentication by
card and signature is covered. As indicated, it is recommended that
the proposed Code will cover all methods of authentication other
than by mere manual signature. Historically in the United States,
the different treatment given to credit and debit card payments is
a reflection of the different era and context in which each of the two
modes of non-cash payment devices was introduced. Specifically,
credit card legislation was passed in the context of consumer
protection in credit rather than payment transactions, and in an
era that preceded the invention of magnetic stripe technology
facilitating PIN authentication. Arguably, this facilitated the emer-
gence of a model premised on two unrelated liability regimes which
has gained worldwide popularity. It is specifically proposed here to
.break away from this model. On this point, the Danish statute is
much more satisfactory.
Second, regarding unauthorized transfers, the position adopted
by the drafters of the Australian Code in relation of the role of the
consumer's fault is not self-evident and its rationale ought to be
reconsidered. As indicated, a rule based on fault may increase
litigation costs and is likely to give financial institutions more than
what is needed to promote due diligence by consumers. While
recognizing that most sources do take into account fault in the
allocation of unauthorized consumer electronic funds transfer
losses, the position recommended here is inspired by the legal
position in the United States. Thereunder, what counts for ex-
panding consumer liability above a low ceiling is only negligence
in the failure to read bank statements or advise the financial institu-
tion of a known unauthorized transfer or breach of security.
Third, the Australian Code may not provide an optimal defini-
tion for an "unauthorized transfer". Particularly, more thought has
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to be given to transfer made without actual authority (whether
express or implied) by a person who is nevertheless in lawful
possession of the access device and Code. Arguably, the Australian
Code treats this as an unauthorized transfer. The American position
seems to be the opposite, while the Danish position purports to
strike a middle ground, under which transfer is to be deemed
authorized only if the holder realized or should have realized the
existence of the risk of abuse.
Fourth, while the Australian Code is unique in addressing specif-
ically and in detail the onus of proof question it may not go far
enough in that regard. True, the Australian Code recognizes that
the onus of proving balance of probability for an unauthorized
transfer is on the financial institution and it goes on and provides
that the mere fact that the account was accessed with the correct
access method, that is, in compliance with the agreed upon security
procedure, "while significant", is not by itself "proof on the bal-
ance of probability that the user contributed to losses".45 But at
the same time, it does not specifically say whether the mere proof
as to the use of the correct access method is "proof on the balance
of probability" as to whether the transfer was authorized.
Presumably, the implication is that it is not adequate; otherwise,
if the transfer is to be regarded as authorized, there would not have
been any question as to loss or contribution to the loss. Arguably,
three situations are covered: (a) where unauthorized use is proven
and no contribution to losses by user is proven, user is exonerated
from any liability whatsoever; (b) where both loss caused by
unauthorized use and user's contribution to loss are proven, user
bears extensive liability; and (c) when unauthorized use, but not
user's contribution to loss, is proven, that is, in a case where user's
lack of contribution to loss is not affirmatively proven, user bears
limited liability only. Nevertheless, detailed as it is, the scheme
gives no guidance as to what constitutes proof on the balance of
probability that the transfer was unauthorized. Presumably, the
position in Denmark is clearer, as limited liability may be fastened
on the basis of proof of mere compliance with security procedures.
In conclusion, the various substantive provisions of a new code
may build on past experience as well as on statutes, regulations
and voluntary codes from various sources. However, in the final
analysis, for each issue, the merit of each position ought to be
145. Emphasis added.
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considered on its own so as to provide the optimal scheme for
consumer electronic funds transfer in Canada.
On the basis of the preceding discussion, a statement of princi-
ples to guide in the drafting of a revised comprehensive Consumer
EFT Code for Canada is put forward. Such principles aim at the
enhancement of fairness to consumers in the context of an overall
scheme designed, in a market-oriented framework, to maximize
benefits to society as well as to strike a sound balance between
consumers and financial institutions.
The scope of the provisions ought to be comprehensive in terms
of both transactions and participants. To that end, it ought to
become a Consumer EFr Code of Conduct, covering all payments
authenticated by consumers other than by means of a mere signature,
and binding on all institutions providing either such payment ser-
vices or accounts into which such payments are posted.
Proposed principles are set out as follows:
1. An all-inclusive definition is to be given to an "authorized
transfer", as covering actual as well as apparent authority
or authority by estoppel, and excluding cases of trickery or
physical coercion. More generally, the principle is that an
"authorized transfer" is one for which a customer is bound
under the law of agency. In connection with apparent au-
thority or estoppel, specific rules ought to be stated as to
whether the mere voluntary surrender of means of access
is tantamount to conferring such authority, or whether as
in Denmark, for full liability, there has to be an added
requirement of realization of the existence of a risk of
abuse. 146
2. A consumer is liable for the amount of all authorized trans-
fers as well as of fraudulent transfers where he or she knew
of or took part in the fraud.
3. To charge the consumer with liability so as to be entitled
to debit his or her account with the amount of an electronic
funds transfer the financial institution must prove either an
authorized transfer or a fraudulent transfer with either the
146. In this context, a question may also arise as to the voluntary breach of confidentiality,
as for example, by writing a secret code on a card. While in principle this raises the
issue of liability on the basis of negligence, this type of conduct is quite close to actual
disclosure.
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knowledge or participation of the consumer. The onus of
proof is that of balance of probabilities or on a preponder-
ance of evidence or probabilities. This onus of proof ap-
plies to all material details of transfer and not only its
existence.
4. To rely on verification according to a security procedure
agreed upon between the financial institution and the con-
sumer, the institution must prove that:
(1) the financial institution accepted the payment order
in compliance with the security procedure, including,
where required, that a genuine card issued by the insti-
tution was used in the transaction;
(2) the security procedure is a commercially reasonable
method for the verification of authority and attribution;
and
(3) at all material times the computer system that verified
authentication to the satisfaction of the financial insti-
tution was operating properly, or if it was not, the fact
of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity
of the system.
"Security procedure" includes the use of card, PIN, digital
signature, password, and card with manual signature, PIN or
digital signature.
5. By itself, and against the denial by the consumer of an
authorized transfer, such evidence is not sufficient proof
of an authorized transfer. In response to the consumer's
denial, the financial institution ought to conduct full inves-
tigation and make its results available to the consumer. The
findings of this investigation will be taken into account
in assessing whether the financial institution has proven
authority.
6. A consumer who denies a transfer was authorized notwith-
standing proper proof as to verification, is required to fully
co-operate with the financial institution, to act in good
faith, disclose all relevant information, and assist in the
investigation. The consumer's compliance with this obliga-
tion will be taken into account in determining whether the
financial institution has complied with the onus of proof as
to an authorized transfer.
2003)
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7. With respect to unauthorized transfers, occurring before
the consumer advises the financial institution of the loss or
theft of his or her card (or any other access device) or of
material breach of security, proof of verification, as re-
quired under principle no. 4 above, entitles the financial
institution to claim from the consumer the smaller of the
amount of the unauthorized transfers and a prescribed
(small) sum and charge it to the consumer's account. (This
is on the basis of the statute in Denmark.) (Alternatively, as
under Reg. E in the United States, minimum sum liability is
only as of two days after actual knowledge of unauthorized
loss, with the amount increasing thereafter up to another
low sum.) An annual ceiling may be set for liability under
such a principle. There is thus a limited liability for prop-
erly verified transfers not proven to be authorized.
8. A consumer is under an obligation to examine carefully all
periodic statements sent to him or her by the financial
institution. In connection with passbook accounts, the con-
sumer is under an obligation to update it regularly, at least
every 30 days, and carefully examine all entries so updated.
A consumer who learns of an unauthorized transfer or
should have learned of such an transfer had he or she
complied with this obligation, and does not report it to the
financial institution, becomes liable to all unauthorized
transfers occurring as of 30 days after he or she learned or
should have learned of the unauthorized transfers, which-
ever is earlier. (The period may be shortened in cases of
actual knowledge by the consumer.) Liability under this
principle is not limited to transfers properly verified by the
financial institution.
9. Under any of the above, consumer is liable for unautho-
rized transfers only:
(1) where timely advice by him or her would have pre-
vented the loss;
(2) where a proper mechanism for notifying the financial
institution is available and properly advised to the con-
sumer; and
(3) within applicable withdrawal and transaction limits.
10. A special rule ought to apply to lost SVPs in circumstances
where the issuer cannot prevent future unauthorized use.
[Vol. 38
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Yet, loaded value is to be treated as lost cash only in a
framework that puts strict limits on the amount of value that
may be loaded on an svp, particularly in connection with
mere card authentication.
